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otic, is to either stay at home in quiet submission, or else to swell the number of ballots for Mr. Lincoln. To vote for another, even for a Democrat, is not at all necessarily to abandon either the war or the country.
If the main policy, that of securing the unity of the country, and establishing law and order among the people, be maintained, it is not so very apparent as to need only the statement, that Government cannot be 'strengthened' without reëlecting Mr. Lincoln.
It is conceded by the writer just here that the feeling of dissatisfaction with the Administration was very deep in 1862, and had the election then occurred, would have resulted in its defeat, and inadvertently it is also implied that the recovery of lost ground in 1863, was owing to the prominence given to Mr. Vallandingham. Very well. What does this prove? Not that the people put their stamp on the acts and deeds of Mr. Lincoln as constitutional, or necessary, or right, but only expressed their dissatisfaction with representatives of extreme measures in the other direction. Even in Ohio, where Brough's majority over Vallandingham was so overwhelming, the Democracy can now show a solid phalanx of nearly 200,000 voters.
Yet, in order to 'preserve peace at home,' that is, in the North, it is boldly asserted that that which was done in Ohio, not seven months since, must be done in the nation (the North) not seven months hence. An overwhelming majority must, in other words, be given for Mr. Lincoln in the nation, as for Mr. Brough in his State. The declaration is here plainly made that peace at home, and respect abroad, too, can only thus be preserved. Should this not, then, be the result, and Mr. Lincoln not be retained in power, who is to disturb the peace? We should be sorry to be obliged to think it a part of the Administration or Republican programme, to hold power at all hazards, to disturb the quiet of the North by war, in case of defeat at the polls. And yet it seems here to loom up; for surely the Democrats in power could not but desire the preservation of peace.
And though an overwhelming vote for the war policy should be a sine qua non for securing respect abroad, and damping all hopes in the Confederacy South, yet does it not follow, it is a non sequitur, that only a vote for Lincoln can be a vote 'for the support of the war.'
Indeed, it might be well argued, that the election of a war Democrat must be the most powerful support of the war, for the Republican vote would be necessarily so, and that added to the Democratic majority would be most effectually and effectively doing 'in the nation seven months hence, what was done in Ohio seven months since.'
The next great dogma announced is, in fact, the text of the discourse: 'The Democratic party should not be restored to power, happen what may. That is, ex cathedra, a Papal Bull. As already remarked, part of the argument preceded the theme; the rest follows.
Whilst conceding the 'loyalty and patriotism' of the Democratic party, it is contended that there should be no change, either in the position of parties or in the personnel of the Government, that is, the Administration. The doctors here, in consultation over the 'sick man,' are evidently not homœopathic, but disposed to prescribe and administer quite heavy doses of disagreeable drugs. The prescription, however, like many others, when the doctor's back is turned, will probably lie on the shelf. The patients, for whom the prescription is given, after grave and deliberate consultation, are not likely to take it; chiefly because they have lost all confidence in the physicians who have undertaken the case. Should it be swallowed by some, it would probably soon show its poisonous ingredients, in making the patients sick unto death.
But, seriously how simple is it to presume that the leaders and masses of the