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desire, that is it which he for his part calleth "good"; and the object of his hate and aversion, "evil"; and of his contempt, "vile" and "inconsiderable." For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof.

The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum and turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signs promiseth good; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for pulchrum we say in some things, "fair"; in others, beautiful," or "handsome," or "gallant," or "honourable," or "comely," or "amiable"; and for turpe, "foul," "deformed," "ugly," "base," "nauseous," and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the "mien," or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, "delightful"; and good as the means, which is called utile, "profitable"; and as many of evil: for "evil" in promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and end, is molestum, "unpleasant," "troublesome"; and evil in the means, inutile, "unprofitable," "hurtful."

As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in appearance; to the sight, light and colour;