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INTRODUCTION.

religious the sovereign hands over the government of his subjects to a pope, or a supreme pastor, or an "assembly of pastors," these then exercise their charge not jure divino, but jure civili, — not in God's right, but in the right of the sovereign. Whereas, the sovereign himself performs his office as supreme pastor jure divino. The sovereign, then, is supreme in things religious with reference to the government of his subjects.[1] But here again appears the question of the individual conscience. We have seen that in things civil external actions in defiance of the sovereign's will cannot be tolerated on the ground of the claims of the individual conscience. Is this so also in matters of religion? Hobbes's position on this difficult question is admirably stated by Professor Robertson as follows: "It is impossible that the state by any machinery of instruction or of penalties should control the thoughts and feelings of the subject. On the subject's side, with freedom of thought left ever untouched, the claim of anything that can be called conscience to override the sovereign's commands must be at once rejected. This is plain so far as temporal affairs are concerned; for the laws of nature enjoin civil obedience as the elementary condition of human welfare. In case of religion, if natural religion is meant, it is not otherwise, because the law of nature is but another name for the law of God; if revealed religion, everything depends upon a true understanding of its import. Now what, according to Scripture, is really necessary for salvation? Only the confession that Jesus is the Christ, with whatever is involved therein, but excluding all the vain dogmas invented by church doctors under the influence of pagan philosophy. The sovereign power which utters any command trenching on the religious sphere is either Christian or it is not. If Christian, it will not go against the fundamental tenet. Whatever it enjoins is, therefore, either indifferent, or is likely

  1. ↑ Leviathan, Pt. III., chap. XLII.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. II., chap. VI.
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