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INTRODUCTION.
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tion, and a more contented life thereby."[1] The commonwealth is necessary for the realization of these ends, because they are not to be realized merely by entering into covenants, but by performing them. However, it is not in accordance with our natural passions to perform such covenants. We, therefore, need some common power, possessed both of authority and means to cause men, through their fear of punishment, to keep their covenants. Such a common power may be established in the following manner: A large number of individuals may assemble together and "confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, ... to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety: and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment."[2] That is, every man must completely surrender his natural right to all things to one common power, so that the commands, decisions, and acts of this power must be regarded by every man as his own. This Hobbes calls real unity; and a multitude thus united he calls a commonwealth. It is the great Leviathan. Or, speaking reverently, it is "that mortal god to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defence." In such a representative man (Hobbes here drops the words "or assembly of men"[3]) consists the

  1. Leviathan, Pt. II., chap. XVII.
  2. Ibid.; also De Corp. Pol., Pt. I, chap. VI.; also Philosophical Rudiments, chap. V.
  3. Of the various forms of government Hobbes undoubtedly had a decided preference for a monarchy. Sir Henry Maine says: "When with a keenness of intuition and lucidity of statement which have never been rivaled, he has made out a case for the universal theoretical existence of sovereignty, it becomes clear that he has, to say the least, a strong preference for monarchies over aristocracies and democracies, or (to use the phraseology of the school which he founded) for individual over corporate sovereignty. Those of his intellectual followers who would have repudiated his politics have often asserted that he has been