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other man a right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature: but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another man's defect of right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original.

Right is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it; or by transferring it to another. By "simply renouncing"; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By "transferring"; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his right; then is he said to be "obliged," or "bound," not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he "ought," and it is his "duty," not to make void that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is "injustice," and "injury," as being sine jure; the right being before renounced, or transferred. So that "injury," or "injustice," in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of scholars is called "absurdity." For as it is there called an absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the beginning so in the world, it is called injustice, and injury voluntarily to undo, that from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply renounceth, or transferreth his right, is a declaration, or signification, by some voluntary and sufficient sign, or signs, that he doth so renounce, or transfer; or hath so renounced, or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only, or actions only; or, as it happeneth most often, both words, and actions. And the same are the "bonds," by which men are bound, and obliged: bonds, that have their strength, not from their own