Page:The ethics of Hobbes (IA ethicsofhobbes00hobb).pdf/110
gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawful, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.
When a man's discourse beginneth not at definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own,and then it is still called opinion; or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing, as the person; and the resolution is called "belief," and "faith": "faith," in the man; "belief," both of the man, and of the truth of what he says. So that in belief are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his virtue. To "have faith in," or "trust to," or "believe a man," signify the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: but to "believe what is said," signifieth only an opinion of the truth of the saying. But we are to observe that this phrase, "I believe in"; as also the Latin, credo in; and the Greek, πιστέυω ἐις, are never used but in the writings of divines. Instead of them, in other writings are put, "I believe him," "I trust him"; "I have faith in him"; "I rely on him": and in Latin, credo illi: fido illi: and in Greek, πιστέυω αὐτω: and that this singularity of the ecclesiastic use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian faith.
But by "believing in," as it is in the creed, is meant, not trust in the person; but confession and acknowledgment of the doctrine. For not only Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they hear him say, whether they understand it, or not; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed.
From whence we may infer, that when we believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken,