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alternately; and divers good and evil consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it; sometimes an aversion from it; sometimes hope to be able to do it; sometimes despair, or fear to attempt it; the whole sum of desires, aversions, hopes and fears continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call "deliberation."

Therefore of things past, there is no "deliberation"; because manifestly impossible to be changed: nor of things" known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know, or think such deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called "deliberation"; because it is a putting an end to the "liberty" we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite, or aversion.

This alternate succession of appetites, aversions, hopes and fears, is no less in other living creatures than in man: and therefore beasts also deliberate.

Every "deliberation" is then said to "end," when that whereof they deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then, we retain the liberty of doing, or omitting; according to our appetite, or aversion.

In "deliberation," the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the "will"; the act, not the faculty, of "willing." And beasts that have "deliberation," must necessarily also have "will." The definition of the "will," given commonly by the Schools, that it is a "rational appetite," is not good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a "voluntary act" is that, which proceedeth from the "will," and no other. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the definition is the same that I have given here. Will therefore, is the last