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ill to an enemy? Or shall we add to the definition and now say that it is just to do good to a friend. when he is good, and hurt to an enemy when he is ill ?

This last, said he, seems to me to be perfectly well expressed.

Is it, then, said I, the part of a just man to hurt any man?

By all means, said he, he ought to hurt the wicked and his enemies.

But do horses, when they are hurt, become better or worse?

Worse.

Whether in the virtue of dogs or of horses?

In that of horses.

And do not dogs, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of dogs, and not of horses?

Of necessity.

And shall we not in like manner, my friend, say that men, when they are hurt, become worse in the virtue of a man?

Certainly.

But is not justice the virtue of a man?

Of necessity this likewise.

Of necessity then, friend, those men who are hurt must become more unjust.

It seems so.

But can musicians, by music, make men unmusical?

It is impossible.

Or horsemen, by horsemanship, make men unskilled in horsemanship?

It cannot be.

Or can the just, by justice, make men unjust ; or in general can the good, by virtue, make men wicked?

It is impossible.

For it is not, as I imagine, the effect of heat to make cold, but of its contrary.

Yes.

Nor is it the effect of drought to make moist, but its contrary.

Certainly.

Neither is it the part of a good man to hurt, but of his contrary.

It appears so.

But the just is good?