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NOTES OF RECENT CASES yers might well rejoice if there were more actions involving situations like that presented in Deaton v. Lawson, 82 Pacific Reporter, 879. It there ap peared that a contract for the rendition of medical services for plaintiff declared that it was made by and between the officers of a certain medical in stitution, and the physician in charge as party of the first part, and plaintiff as party of the second part. The contract was signed by plaintiff, and with the name of the medical institute written by its manager and owner. The manager and owner, who conducted all the negotiations with plaintiff, was not a physician, the only physician connected with the institution being one who was employed by the month. To throw some light on the pre cise nature of the transaction, it might be well to state that the manager of the institution first ne gotiated with plaintiff, and agreed to cure him within three months for the sum of $85. When the plaintiff came to pay the $85, he exhibited a considerable amount in addition thereto, on sight of which the manager immediately represented that he could give plaintiff a different treatment which would effect a permanent cure within six weeks, but would cost more. These represen tations resulted in a contract by which plaintiff turned over $469 in cash. In an action to re cover this money, it is held that the contract was against public policy and void as an agreement on defendant's part to render professional ser vices as a physician, in violation of the laws of the state, and that the contract could not be con strued as a contract made on behalf of the physi cian employed by defendant. CRIMINAL LAW. (Disorderly House — Usury.) N. J. — The Supreme Court of New Jersey declares that those who maintain a place where usurious rates of interest are taken, and where the statutes prohibiting usurious interest are habitually violated, are indictable for keep ing a disorderly house. It had formerly been held in that state (State v. Lovell, 39 N. J. Law, 463), that a place where persons gather together to do acts which by law are made crimes or mis demeanors is a disorderly house. The statutes of New Jersey provide that the taking of interest at a greater rate than six per cent shall be unlaw ful, and declare that the penalty for violation of this statute shall be that in suits to enforce contracts in which a higher rate of interest is reserved no interest whatever shall be recover able. Under these provisions, the court declares that the taking of usurious interest is a violation of the positive law of the state, and that to main tain a place for such habitual violation or a place where agreements for such habitual violation may

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be made is a misdemeanor. The holding is sus tained by two cases cited by the court, where con victions for the offense of keeping a disorderly house were sustained under facts somewhat similar. The first is that of McClean v. State, 49 N. J. 471, 9 Atl. 681, where the defendant carried on the business of bookmaking in a box or booth on the grounds of an association manag ing a race track, and Harring v. State, 51 N. J. Law 386, 17 Atl. 1079, where the accused kept a room commonly resorted to for the purpose of betting upon horse-racing, in violation of the statute prohibiting gaming. State v. Dimant, 62 Atlantic Reporter, 286. CRIMINAL LAW. (Homicide — Binding In structions — Degree of Crime.) Penn. — The Su preme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Fellows, 6 1 Atlantic Reporter, 922, declares that an instruction in a homicide case that the court does not deem it necessary to define murder in the second degree or manslaughter for the reason that there are no elements of manslaughter or second degree murder in the case, but that defendant is either guilty of murder in the first degree or not guilt}' at all, is reversible error be cause interfering with the statutory right of the jury on a conviction of murder to determine the degree of the crime. It is stated that under the statute (Pub. Laws, 382), providing that if the jury shall find the person guilty of murder they shall ascertain in their verdict whether it be murder of the first or second degree, the court never has a right under any circumstances to determine the degree of the crime if one has been committed. Mitchell, C. J., dissenting, points out the fact that in. Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. 60, the judge charged the jury that if the prisoner was guilty there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the degree since the death having been caused by poison, the crime must have been murder in the first degree if the poison was pur posely administered, so that if the accused was guilty, the crime was murder in the first degree, and it was the duty of the jury to say so. In McMeen v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 300, 9 Atl. 878, the court charged that if the jury found that defendant sent poison to his wife with the intent to take her life it was murder in the first degree, and the jury should say so in their verdict. In both these cases the charge was held not errone ous, and the chief justice submits that there is no practical distinction between these charges and the instruction in the present case. CRIMINAL LAW. (Indictment.) Ind. — In Terrell v. State, 75 Northeastern Reporter, 884,