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NOTES OF RECENT CASES by which the sentiments, opinions, conduct, char acter, prospects, interests, or rights of such other person shall be misrepresented, shall be guilty of forgery. Under this statute it is held that the false making of a letter of introduction misrepre senting the identity of the defendant and asking the employe's of the corporation of which the pur ported signer was an officer, to show defendant any favors they could, constituted the crime of forgery, although there was no injury to the per son whose name was forged to the letter. The facts of this case are somewhat peculiar, and the admission in evidence of all of them seems to furnish some ground for the statement in the dis senting opinion that defendant was in fact, con victed of a crime of which he was not charged. It appears that defendant accidentally met a certain Miss Anderson who was a telegraph oper ator in a hotel, and becoming enamoured of her, represented himself to be a son of a wealthy and prominent resident of New York City. After ward, defendant wrote a note to Miss Anderson stating that he desired to become acquainted with her and afterwards, in an interview, said that he would try to get some one to give him a letter of introduction. Later, he presented such a letter purporting to be signed by one of the vice-presidents of the Western Union Telegraph Company liy which Miss Anderson was employed. The pres entation of this letter was followed by a rather brief courtship and engagement to marry, which failed of consummation because of defendant's sudden disappearance. All these matters were admitted in evidence, although the crime charged was the making of the letter, and as previously remarked, some color is thereby given to the state ment in the dissenting opinion of Cullen, C. J., that the defendant was indicted for one offense and tried, convicted, and punished for a totally differ ent one. The chief contention of the dissenting opinion is that the statute was enacted solely to prevent injury to the purported author of the falsely-made or uttered instrument, and that as no such injury was shown in this case, there was no offense. CUSTOM DUTIES. (Forfeitures — False State ments.) — C. C. A., 8th Circ. — A construction of act June 10, 1890, c. 407, § 9, is to be found in the case of United States v. Ninety-Nine Dia monds, 139 Fed. Rep. 961. The conclusion at which the court arrives is one which seems to be in accordance with the principles of common sense and natural justice, as well as correct legal reason ing. The statute referred to provides that if any owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person shall make or attempt to make any entry of im ported merchandise by means of any fraudulent

III

or false invoice, or false statement or practice, by means of which the United States shall be de prived of the lawful duties accruing upon the merchandise, it shall be forfeited. Under this statute an action was brought by the United States against one Bockstruck upon the ground that he, in making his entry, had declared that he was the owner and that one Fink was the seller of the merchandise, when the truth was that Bockstruck was the consignee and Fink was the con signor. The diamonds had been sent and in voiced to Bockstruck from Antwerp by Fink, under an agreement that he should pay the duty and the expense of transportation from New York and should have the option to keep and buy them at the invoice price, or return to Fink any or all the diamonds. He paid the duties and the trans portation charges from New York, and had a lien on the diamonds for those amounts. Under these circumstances it is held that the word "false" in the statute means more than "incorrect" or "erro neous" and implies wrong or culpable negligence, and signifies knowingly or negligently untrue. It is also held in general terms that the words " false" and "falsely" in statutes and contracts which im pose forfeitures or penalties for false acts or acts falsely done, generally imply culpable negligence or wrong; they signify more than incorrect or incorrectly, and mean knowingly, or intentionally, or negligently false, in the absence of express pro visions in the statutes or contracts, or reasonable implications therefrom, their subjects and the circumstances to the contrary. In view of these principles, it is held that as Bockstruck's state ment did not deprive the government of any lawful duties, it did not constitute an offense under the statute. CUSTOMS DUTIES. (Illegal Importation of Free Goods — Forfeiture.) U. S. D. C. for If. D. of N. Y. — A case which appears to be somewhat in conflict with United States v. 99 Diamonds, is that of United States v. 50 Waltham Watch Move ments, 139 Federal Reporter, 290. In the latter case it is held that proceedings for the forfeiture of merchandise illegally imported may be sus tained under Rev. St., § 3082 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2014), though the United States has not been defrauded of an}' sum, and there has been no intent to defraud. The facts, to be sure, are somewhat different, inasmuch as it appears in the present case that certain watch movements which had been sent into Canada by the manufacturer were returned into the United States without any change whatever having been made in them either materially or as to their value. The regulations of the treasury department required in such cases a consular certificate in proof of identification of