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of £200 were to be a liquidated sum; and from thenceforth to carry interest at £10 per cent. to the 25th of March 1704, when interest was reduced by act of parliament, to £8 per cent. per ann. And the principal and interest due at that period, were to be made a principal sum, and to carry interest at £8 per cent. per ann. from that time, till the 25th of March 1722, when interest was reduced by act of parliament, to £7 per cent. per ann. And the sum due at that period for principal and interest, was to be made a principal sum, and to carry interest at £7 per cent. per ann. from that time till the expiration of the lease made by King James I. to John King and John Bingley, which expired on the 18th of May 1724. And as to the appellant M'Nemara, his Lordship directed the following issue to be tried between the respondents and him, viz. Whether he, at any time and when, had notice that the co-heirs of Sir John Eustace had, or claimed any and what right and title to the lands in question, after the lease to King and Bingley should expire; and his Lordship was pleased to declare, that on return of the verdict, he would make such further order, as to the allowance to be given, and in what manner the account from the expiration of the said lease should be carried on, as should be fit.

[270] From this decree the present appeal was brought; and on behalf of the appellant Tasburgh it was insisted (T. Lutwyche, N. Fazakerly), that as this case was circumstanced, there ought to be no redemption upon any terms whatever, it being expressly agreed by the release of the 31st of May 1681, that if the money was not paid within five years, the estate should be irredeemable; it ought, therefore, to be considered as a conditional purchase, and the rather, because there was no covenant on the part of Sir John Eustace to pay the money. That as the appellant Tasburgh, or those under whom he claimed, could not compel payment, it ought not to have been decreed a mortgage; for, in cases of mortgages, the remedy should be reciprocal, consequently no equity of redemption could arise or spring from the condition contained in the release; for the supposed pledge was only a reversion expectant on a long term of years, whereof no less than forty-three were then to come, during which time it could yield no manner of fruit or profit; and, in reality, the £200 was more than a sufficient consideration for the absolute purchase of the reversion, as lands were usually sold in Ireland at that time, and for near twenty years after; so that if the lands had continued to sink in value, as they did for some years, Mr. Tasburgh would have had a bad bargain; and it was apprehended, that the subsequent rise in the value of lands in that kingdom, which was totally unforeseen and unexpected at the time of this transaction, could be no reason to turn such a bargain into a mortgage. That the decree of the 11th of December 1688, ought to be binding on Sir John Eustace, and upon the respondents, as deriving under him; and ought not, at this distance of time, to be impeached or altered on an original bill; and the rather, as Sir John had full notice of that decree; and though he returned to Ireland soon after the reduction of Limerick, which happened in October 1691, yet he never sought for a redemption, or attempted to impeach the decree. That the appellant Tasburgh's plea ought to have been allowed, either on the arguing it, or at the hearing of the cause; for, after an acquiescence of forty-three years, without any manner of excuse for the greatest part of the time, the respondents ought not to be admitted to a redemption, so apparently to the appellant's prejudice; but, on the contrary, their bill ought to have been dismissed with costs. And even supposing this to be the case of a mortgage, clearly and undoubtedly redeemable; yet, considering the length of time that the mortgagor, and those claiming under him, had acquiesced, without demanding such redemption, and regard being had to the other circumstances of this case, there ought to be no redemption decreed. It was therefore hoped, that the decree would be reversed, and the respondents bill dismissed with costs.

On the part of the other appellant M'Nemara, it was contended (J. Willes, J. Verney), that the money not having been paid at the time mentioned in the conveyance, and there being no remedy on the part of the vendee to compel such payment, but only a proviso, giving the vendor an election to re-purchase at the end of five years, [271] which he was at full liberty to do, or not, and could not be compelled to do by the vendee; and the interest purchased being only a dry reversion, from which no annual profit could arise, till the expiration of the term, and consequently could not, during that time, be any fund for the payment of interest, no redemption ought to have been decreed; and especially, after so long an acquiescence under a