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to the plaintiff, at such time and place as the said Master should direct. But as to the rooms, or to the plaintiff's being restored to the said lecture, his Lordship saw no cause to give him any relief, and therefore ordered, that the bill, as to all other matters, save the account so directed as aforesaid, should stand dismissed with costs. And as to that account, his Lordship reserved the consideration of costs, until after the Master should have made his report.

[252] From this decree the plaintiff appealed; contending (W. Hawkins, J. Jenyns), that the lecture was duly supplied, either by himself in person, or by a sufficient curate, even at, and at all times before his deprivation; and that such supply by curate was never in the least objected to, or complained of, until after such deprivation; nor was any notice or intimation given to the appellant, that a personal supply of the lecture was necessary. That there was nothing in the nature of the thing, which indispensably required, that the duty of such lecture should be performed in person; if therefore there was any such necessity, it must depend on some express clause in the original foundation of the lecture. That the clause insisted on for this purpose, was only taken from the recitals of a deed, no way appearing to be actually pursuant to the original settlement pretended to be recited, nor proved to be taken from it, and therefore ought to be of no force in depriving the appellant of his freehold. That even this clause was far from being express, that the lecturer should be deprivable in an arbitrary manner, without any previous notice or intimation of the nature of his tenure, or any summons to answer the charge made against him; and that so large and unbounded a power ought never to be implied where it is not expressed. That the respondent Sir John standing by, and consenting to the appellant's expending near £60 on a house, commonly reputed the Lecturer's House, was, at least, an encouragement to the appellant, to proceed in his expences, and ought to amount to an implied promise of suffering him to remain in it during his continuance in the lecture. Should it be objected, that by a clause in the recital of the original settlement, the lecture was to be given to one of the best scholars in the University of Oxford, and which implied that he ought always to do his duty in person; it might be answered, that granting there was such a clause, the intent of it could not but be well satisfied by a curate, qualified in such manner as the Lecturer himself ought to be; and which was clearly the case at present, for the trustees had so good an opinion of the Curate and his abilities, as to nominate him in the room of the appellant. And should it be further objected, that the respondents, the trustees, had done nothing more in depriving the appellant and putting in another Lecturer, than what the Court of Chancery would have obliged them to do on a bill brought for that purpose; it was answered, that supposing the court might have made such a decree upon a bill with proper parties, yet it was apprehended, they would never have made such a decree on a bill to which the appellant was no party; and therefore much less could the respondents legally proceed to a deprivation of the appellant, without giving, or at least endeavouring to give him notice, to appear and answer for himself.

On the other side it was insisted (R. Raymond, T. Lutwyche), that by the express words and manifest intention of the pious founder of this charity, it was provided, that the annual sum of £50 should be paid to the Lecturer, so long as he should attend the charge of diligent preaching [253] there, if he should not otherwise, by necessity, be hindered; and it was presumed, that a Lecturer's extravagance, which occasioned him to withdraw himself for fear of his creditors, was not such a necessity as could be pleaded in his excuse. Besides, it appeared by the deed of trust, that the Lecturer of Churchill was to be presented to the living of Sarsden; which was, no doubt, intended as a further encouragement to him to perform his duty personally. That by the words of the deed, whenever the place of Lecturer should be void by death, removal, or other departure of the Lecturer, the trustees were to choose a new one out of the best scholars of the University of Oxford; so that a departure of the Lecturer was manifestly intended to entitle the trustees to make a new choice; and it was also plain, that a personal service was meant, otherwise the choice out of the best scholars in the University would have been vain. That the trustees, by appointing another person in the year 1709, after more than five years absence, had fully executed their trust; and the person now regularly appointed, ought not to be removed in favour of the appellant, who had so grossly neglected his duty; and as to the words [during his natural life] in the appointment, though they were not in the draught