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wherefore the said Bishop did then and there as ordinary of that church, and as he lawfully might, and of right ought, wholly refuse to admit, institute, or induct the said John Eyre into the said church so being vacant as aforesaid.

To the first plea the defendant in error demurred generally, and also demurred to the second plea, and assigned for causes of demurrer to that plea, that there is no specification of the undue influence, or power, or controul mentioned in the said second plea, with which the defendant in error was purposed to be invested over the said John Eyre, as rector of the said rectory, to which the said defendant in error could give any answer, or upon which a proper issue could be joined to be tried by a jury. And also that it is not in that plea alledged, how and in what manner the said John Eyre was or did become a person unfit to be admitted, instituted, and inducted into the said rectory and parish church, so that any issue could be taken upon such allegation of his unfitness.

The Bishop joined in demurrer, and in Hilary term 1782, the Court of Common Pleas gave judgment for the defendant in error upon both pleas.

Upon this judgment the Bishop brought a writ of error in the Court of King's Bench, and assigned the common errors; and upon argument in Michaelmas term 1782, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed. [1 Bro. C. C. 96.]

From this judgment of affirmance the present writ of error was brought; and on behalf of the plaintiff in error it was contended (J. Mansfield, E. Law, W. Adam), that although there are several adjudged cases upon the subject of general bonds of resignation, none of them have arisen in the same form, or between parties acting in the same capacity, and [215] under circumstances similar to the present; and therefore they ought not to be considered as precedents by which this case was to be determined. That the Bishop, or Ordinary, is authorised by law to judge, in the first instance, of the fitness or unfitness of the person presented to him for institution; and the Bishop of London had in this instance exercised his authority according to law. That it is in the power of the patron, by means of a general bond, to establish two modes of selling a vacant living, which is simony, either of which are equally certain and infallible: 1st, The parties may make the penalty in the bond adequate to the price of the living; the presentee when instituted, may refuse to sign, and pay the penalty without suit; or may make known the execution of the bond, and then tender resignation to the Bishop, which the Bishop under those circumstances will probably refuse; upon his refusal the bond may be put in suit; and thus also, by a circuity, the penalty may be paid, as the price of the living. The second mode of selling a living which is vacant, through the medium of a general bond of resignation, is equally obvious and practicable; the penalty of the bond of resignation may be made excessive, much above the real value of the living; the patron may, during the incumbency of the presentee, who executes the bond to resign, sell the next turn or right of presentation, and at an advanced price, and after such sale require the incumbent to resign in terms of his bond. By this means the first presentation is fictitious, and the sale of the second presentation, though made under the pretence of selling a right of presentation to a full benefice, is in reality the sale of a vacant living. That a general bond to resign, puts the person who enters into such bond under the power of the lay patron, instead of being under the authority of the Bishop, to whom he swears canonical obedience, and whom by law he is obliged to obey, and is thus contrary to good policy, creating an influence which tends to subvert ecclesiastical discipline and subordination. That general bonds of resignation are contrary to law, by altering the tenure of the office of a beneficed clergyman; for every benefice being an office for life, the patron can grant it for life only he cannot grant it for years; he cannot grant it at the will of himself, for such grant in direct terms would be void, as contrary to the very tenure of the office: where there is a general bond of resignation entered into, the same alteration of the tenure is effected by circuity too here the patron grants, and the presentee accepts, at the will of the patron, that benefice which the law intends to be conferred and holden for life. That although a Court of Equity will grant relief, in case the patron makes an improper use of a general bond to resign, yet from the extreme difficulty of discovering the real purpose for which they are used, it can seldom be possible to procure such relief, or to guard by that means against the bad consequences that follow from such bonds being tolerated. The bad purpose not being discovered, cannot be prevented but by a solemn