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offices occurs in that part which relates to the possessions that had been awarded to the then Earl of Oxford; but is not mentioned in that part of the act which relates to the estates awarded to the heirs general. The remark, that this office is not mentioned in the recital of the award, in the partition deed between the co-heirs of the fourteenth Earl of Oxford, can have no weight, as it is not to be expected that this deed would recite any part of the award not relating to the subject matter of that partition, which this office clearly was not.

With respect to the observation, that the sixteenth Earl of Oxford did not succeed to this office, and even assisted at the investiture of the Earl of Warwick thereto, it is submitted, that the conclusion drawn from thence, viz. "That no just claim can be derived to this office from the said sixteenth Earl, to any of his descendants," is by no means warrantable; for this Earl of Oxford appears to have been restored to the enjoyment of this office, in the reign of Queen Mary, and was the person who attempted to intail it in the fourth year of Queen Elizabeth, and died seised of the office, and his heirs inherited the same.

But as a full and complete answer to the claim now set up by Lord Percy, it was submitted, that the office of Lord Great Chamberlain of England, being an office with considerable fees and profits annexed to it, may be sued for and recovered by an assize, or other real action (Second Inst. 411, 412. Jehu Webb's case, Coke's Report, 8. fol. 47); that it falls within the description of hereditaments in the statute of limitations, passed in the thirty-second year of the reign of King Henry the Eighth, which might be pleaded in bar to any action brought by Lord Percy for the recovery of it; and that their Lordships would not give any extraordinary countenance to a claim, which has lain dormant for above two centuries and a half; and to which, if prosecuted in a Court of Law, there would be an unanswerable objection.

With respect to the claim of the Duchess Dowager of Atholl, supposing the facts stated in support of it, as far as they relate to the dispute concerning this high office in 1625, to be true, the conclusion from those facts does by no means follow; nor does it appear, that there was any error or mistake in the certificate of the Lords to King Charles the First, in the year 1625.

For as it is admitted by the Duchess Dowager of Atholl, that the several titles of all the competitors in 1625 were before the house; and that the opinion of the majority of the Judges, upon the contest between the heir general and the heir male of Henry, the eighteenth Earl of Oxford, was in favour of the heir general; and that subsequent to the delivery of that opinion, viz. on the 1st of April 1626, the counsel for the then Lord Willoughby and Lady Derby (both of whom claimed in the character of [172] heir general to the eighteenth Earl of Oxford) were heard before the house. It clearly follows, that the only possible dispute between the counsel for those parties—the only possible subject matter of debate for the house upon the arguments of these counsel, and the respective claims of the then competitors for this office, must have been, whether the then Lord Willoughby, or Lady Derby, should be considered, upon that occasion, as heir general of the then late Earl of Oxford; and whether the rules applicable to the descent of lands and other real property, or those which are confined to dignities and titles of nobility, should govern the decision of the question then before them. It is therefore insisted, that the determination of the house, that this office descended to Lord Willoughby, as cousin and heir general to Henry, then last Earl of Oxford, without calling in, or requiring the assistance of the Judges, is a clear decision that the rules relative to real property, and not to titles of honour and nobility, are applicable to, and must govern the descent of this office; and that the certificate afterwards presented to his Majesty, (although there may be some inaccuracy in the expression,) was perfectly consistent with the opinion of the house upon the claims of the several parties, which had been fairly and fully discussed before them.

After so clear a decision, by the Supreme Court of Judicature of this kingdom, that the rules applicable to titles of nobility do not govern the descent of this office, it would be disrespectful to state any of the numerous arguments that occur in favour of this decision; but, independent of this determination, it is further and finally submitted, that the statute of limitations is as complete a bar to the claim of her Grace the Duchess Dowager of Atholl, as to that of Lord Percy.

The opinion of the house upon this occasion was conceived in the following terms, viz. After hearing counsel fully on the several claims to his Majesty of the office of