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DONALDSON v. BECKETT [1774]
II BROWN.

divide it thus: every book, they say, consists of two distinct parts; the material part, namely, the paper, print, and binding, which is a manufacture; and the immaterial part, namely, the doctrine contained in it, which is the facture of the mind. The property in the material part, passes according to the law in all other cases; but the property in the immaterial part remains to the author, which is about as intelligible as if one should state John to be the owner of the carcase and limbs of a horse, and Thomas the owner of his colour, shape, speed, and mettle. This seems to have led to an elaborate discussion of the principles of property; whether it could exist in an idea, for want of substance, physical focality, distinguishing marks, and many other enquiries of the same abstract nature. A mere scio-machina, wherein, by no uncommon accident, the absurdity of the position made a serious answer seem ridiculous. Some have stated the property to exist in the profits of the sale, which, as they assume for the purpose, belong to the original author. But this is only substituting another, and, as it seems, a less proper phrase in the place of the word monopoly, which, to use the words of Brooke, is property not properly known. The privilege, however, of monopoly, is an interest or estate well known to the law. It only remains to shew what title the author has to it. Some have contented themselves with declaiming upon the moral fitness, the reasonableness, the justice and public conveniency, of putting into the hands of an author the means of raising upon the world, for his own profit, the utmost sum of money for the use of his book, and this can only be done by giving him a monopoly. Now, if the truth of all this were admissible and clear, it would prove at most that it ought to be done, not that it has been done, and that those who alone can do it, ought to consider and pronounce upon it but in fact they have considered of it, and pronounced upon it otherwise. Some contend, that such a monopoly is already established by law, and appeal to usage for the proof of it; but the usage adduced is incompetent, for want of time beyond memory, and in truth does not exist, as appears abundantly by the instances produced to prove it. Some draw their proof of the common law, from the injunctions granted by the Court of Chancery; admitting, or rather insisting, that such injunctions ought to be granted only where the common law is known and clear; admitting also, that [134] the case is new to the common law, and was therefore properly sent thither by the Court of Chancery. After which it will not be wonderful, if injunctions granted in a Court of Equity, should not be thought an indisputable proof of the common law.

Note 2.—[145] The universities were so much alarmed by this determination, that in the year 1775, they applied for and obtained an act of parliament for securing to them and the colleges of Eton, Westminster, and Winchester, the perpetuity in all copies then, or at any time afterwards given to, or acquired by them. Vide stat. 15 Geo. III. c. 53.

H.L. i.
849
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