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relative to copies, till after the year 1640; the usage, whatever it be, is therefore not immemorial.

It is also said, that from the erection of the Stationer's Company, copies were entered as property, and pirating was punished. The common law, according to this, begins with the Stationer's Company. The first charter was in 1556, 3d and 4th Philip and Mary, and was founded on principles of bigotry, to prevent, as it recites, the renewal of great and detestable heresies. The new members of the Company, in number ninety-seven, were made literary constables to search for books, etc. and though the Crown had no right over the trade of printing, it was ordered. "That no man should exercise the mystery of printing, unless he was of the Stationer's Company, or had a licence." To this Company so constituted, and thus armed with a general warrant, we are referred for evidence of the common law.

But it is further said, that in the year 1558, the charter was confirmed, in the 1st of Eliz. and that in that year, there are entries of copies to particular persons, and down from that time.—To this it is answered, that patent rights began soon after the first introduction of printing. Froissart's Chronicles of England, France, and Spain, were published cum privilegio a rege indulto, by Richard Pinson, 1525. From that time, the patents ad solum imprimendum were innumerable. Men who had such rights, might enter their books as property in the Stationer's Register; but neither the patent or the entry can be received as evidence of a common law right. The charter embraced all the printers in England: the new Company had the sole privilege of printing, and they agreed to divide the spoil amongst themselves; but authors were not parties to the agreement.

Still it is said, that the Stationer's Company was empowered to make bye-laws.—They were so; and those bye-laws might create a relative right among the members of the Company. In 1681, a bye-law declares, that where a book was entered to any member, such person, by ancient usage of the Company, has been reputed and taken to be the proprietor: by ancient usage of the realm, had been more conducive to the point. But it was not competent to the Stationer's Company, to make laws for the rest of the kingdom; and if it had, it would not be common law.

But the decrees of the Star Chamber have been cited as strong authorities, in support of the bye-laws and customs of the Stationer's Company; and that a Star Chamber decree in 1637, expressly supposes a copy-right to exist, otherwise than by patent, order, or entry, which could only be by common law. The Star Chamber was a criminal court, and had not constitutional authority to determine civil rights. That court has long since been abolished, without regret; and it is the happiness of the subject, that the common law has flowed through purer channels. The relative rights of the Company were supported per fas et nefas, in [137] those times of high prerogative licences from the Archbishop of Canterbury were frequent; and such licences were neither patent, order, or entry. Moreover, a common law right is never expressly mentioned in any ordinance, proclamation, or bye-law. It is often called the right, privilege, authority, or allowance solely to print. Had the Star Chamber, and the High Commission Court, expressly stated a common law right, it could not be received as an authority in point; and a common law usage cannot arise by mere implication from dark hints of the Star Chamber. The same argument applies to acts of the Privy Council, to edicts, proclamations, the ordinance of the two houses in 1642, and all the ordinances during the usurpation. This whole body of precedents forms the history of despotism, but not of the common law. The most that can be said in their favour is, that they supported an usage, first set on foot by acts of state, by patents, bye-laws, etc.

It has been said, that in those times, copies wore protected by a much speedier and more effectual remedy, than actions at law, or bills in equity; namely, the licensing act, whereby the printing of any book without consent of the owner was forbidden and that soon after the expiration of that act, it appears by Lilly's Entries, p. 67, that in Hil. 31 Car. II. there was a case of Ponder v. Bradyll, for printing 4000 copies of the Pilgrim's Progress, whereof the plaintiff was proprietor. One successful action at law would have been a better proof of the right, than a thousand instances of arbitrary power. The ownership was created by patent, order, bye-law of the Stationers, etc. and if the licensing act recognized a right so created, it was an act of the Legislature; but this act, with all the other encroachments upon liberty, has