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sole liberty of printing and reprinting such book and books for the term of fourteen years, [131] to commence from the day of first publishing the same, and no longer.

And a proviso, by which it is further enacted, "That after the expiration of the said term of fourteen years, the sole right of printing and disposing of copies shall return to the authors thereof, if they are then living, for another term of fourteen years." The appellants in their answers also said, that the copies of the several works, in the bill mentioned to have been written by Mr. Thomson, having, as appeared by the bill, been assigned by him and first published in 1729, the sole right of printing, publishing, and selling the same, could not be extended beyond the term of twenty-eight years, from the time of such first publication, which term expired in 1757. They denied, that during that term they were concerned in the printing, publishing, or selling any copies of the said works. They admitted the death of Andrew Millar, and that before his death he made his will, and appointed such persons executors, as in the bill were named; and that it was proved, in the manner therein mentioned. But they insisted, for the reasons aforesaid, that the executors of Andrew Millar, did not by his will, or otherwise, become entitled to the sole right of printing and publishing the said poems. The appellants also admitted, that they had since the expiration of the said term of twenty-eight years, without the consent of the respondents, printed, published, and sold several copies of the poems in the bill mentioned; and insisted, that unless the respondents were able to make out a title to the sole and exclusive property of the said poems, paramount the aforesaid act of parliament, the appellants were, by virtue of that act, well authorised in printing, publishing, and selling the said poems, and were not compellable to account for or discover the number of copies they had printed, published, or sold, and ought not to be restrained from the further publication and sale of the same; and therefore they claimed the benefit of the said act of parliament, as if they had pleaded the same in bar to the relief and discovery sought by the bill.

On the 16th of November 1772, the cause was heard before the Lord Chancellor Bathurst, when his Lordship was pleased to decree, that the injunction which had been before granted in the cause, should be made perpetual; and that it should be referred to the Master, to take an account of what had been received by the appellants, or either of them, or by any other person by their order or for their use, from the publishing and sale of the poems in the pleadings mentioned, and that the appellants should pay the respondents what should be found due to them on the balance of the said account; and his Lordship reserved the consideration of costs, until the Master should have made his report; and any of the parties were to be at liberty to apply to the court, as there should be occasion. (See note 1, p. 847.)

[132] In order to obtain a final determination of this great question of literary property, the present appeal was brought; and on be-[133]-half of the appellants it was said (E. Thurlow, J. Dalrymple, A. Murphy), that the object contended for by the respondents, was of so abstruse and chimerical a nature, [134] that it was hardly capable of being defined. It was sometimes called property, and for the sake of distinction, literary property. The word property has various significations. In a philosophical sense, the qualities inherent in any subject, or thing, are called its properties. In a civil sense, property is corporeal or incorporeal. Corporeal property is the actual possession of some substance, with the power of enjoying and disposing of it; but the object now contended for, was not corporeal property. Incorporeal property is of two sorts: 1st, It is a right relating to some substance, as a right to take the profits of land, without having the possession of the land, or a title to it. 2dly, It is a right to exercise some faculty, or to do some particular thing for profit. The perception of the profits, is a taking of some substance or corporeal property and hence the incorporeal right is metaphorically called property. The word thus used becomes equivocal, importing alternately the right, and the profits resulting from the right. In like manner, land and the right to it, are both called property. If the respondents object was an incorporeal right, it is a mere right to do some particular thing for profit. The thing to be done, is the multiplying of copies of books. The sole right of multiplying copies, is a sole right to exercise a natural faculty; and this, it is obvious, is an extraordinary privilege. A sole right to take the profits arising from the exercise of a natural faculty, is a monopoly in itself very extraordinary. This privilege and this monopoly, the respondents chose to call their property, and they