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the plaintiff from the review he seeks. That in the present case, whether the appellant ought in good conscience to disturb the decrees complained of, would appear from the following considerations: I. Whether he had by his bill brought proper parties before the court? II. Whether the errors assigned did really appear upon the face of the decrees, and were sufficient to open them? III. Supposing the errors sufficient, whether the appellant was so interested, as to entitle him to the review and reversal prayed? IV. Whether the pleas, if true, were well pleaded in matter and form?

I. The objection for want of parties, was alone fatal to the bill; it being a principle of natural justice, that none is to be affected without being heard. The decrees of 1759, and 1764, were pronounced (among others) between the mortgagees, legatees, and three of the heirs at law, all parties to the suit and before the court, all attending the Master in taking the account directed by the first decree, and all receiving the directions of the court upon such account, by the second decree; and yet, though almost essentially interested in supporting those decrees, none of them were made parties to this bill of review. The demands of the legatees were established, settled, and ordered to be paid by the last decree, which had likewise liquidated and adjusted the demands of the mortgagees, pursuant to the directions of the first decree; but if the appellant was to prevail, they would all be deprived of the benefit of those decrees, whereby not only the title of their securities was established, but their demands adjusted, and ordered to be raised out of the estate. And if the three heirs at law had been called in, they might and probably would have thought it their interest rather to support the decrees, than to have the cause opened again to the claim of Henrietta and James Barry, who had set up a title paramount to the whole estate: but at all events they ought to have been parties.

II. The errors assigned were of two sorts, the one matter of form, and appearing upon the face of the decree, namely, the want of a replication to the appellant's answer; the other of substance, and to the merits, impeaching the account of profits, and [121] direction of costs, but not apparent upon the decree. As to the account of profits, it was easy to suppose it might appear to the court, that no profits of the estate remained to be accounted for, but what were in the hands of Henrietta Barry, the only adverse party in the cause, and whose tortious possession had occasioned the appointment of a receiver; and that the rest of the profits, if any were received, might appear to be in the receiver's hands, or to have been applied to the discharge of the estate, or to the use of the heirs at law; and all directions relative to the receiver were still open, when he came to be discharged; a period not yet arrived, nor likely to be so, if the appellant's bill was admissible. As to the costs, the litigation in the original and cross cause made those directions just; they were incurred in the common cause, the maintenance of the title to the estate against a title paramount; and when the whole cause was before the court, they could best judge of them. But neither the directions concerning the profits, or the costs, admitting them to be erroneous, were so upon the face of the decree, And as to the want of a replication, to which the whole matter of the plea was applicable, it appeared indeed upon the face of the first decree, and subsequent proceedings; but it was a mere error in point of form, and not sufficient to set aside a decree, and a variety of subsequent proceedings, after inrolment. Replications in equity are mere matters of form, and orders are never denied to file them nunc pro tunc when omitted, or to withdraw them when too hastily put in; and had the objection been taken before inrolment, the court might have put the matter in a proper method to come at justice, and have given the appellant an opportunity, if he had wanted it, to examine witnesses to disprove the wills and codicil. Now it appeared from the pleas, that in the whole proceeding, issue was considered as joined between the parties, and that the omission of replication was a mere mistake that all the heirs at law claimed the estate as heirs to Mary Barry, who they admitted had power over the whole; and as they could claim nothing but what she left undisposed of, they considered it as an estate heavily incumbered; and by the inrolment it appeared, that the estate was incumbered to a very great degree. That the appellant had notice of the wills and codicil, which were set out verbatim, together with the incumbrances, in the original bill; and not thinking it worth his while to engage in the expence of recovering the estate. he left the management of it to the plaintiffs in the original cause, whose legacies interested them to