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appellants had found twenty deeds of purchase made by old Neve, and witnessed by old Norris; but neither of these pieces of evidence was at all material to the point in question. That the equity insisted on by the appellants was, that Norris, who was counsel for old Neve, and drew the settlement and will, purchased the reversion in fee to himself, at an under value, when he was in possession of the estate, under the trust term of ten years; and that therefore, the purchase of this reversion ought to be construed as a purchase in trust for Oliver, Peter, and Francis Neve.

But in answer to this it must be observed, that Norris was only a trustee of this ten years term, for payment of debts and legacies, with the surplus rents to Oliver if living, or else to Peter if living; and if not, then to Francis Neve, his executors or administrators: that this term was antecedent to all the limitations to Oliver, Peter, and Francis Neve, who were only successive tenants for 99 years, if they so long lived, with several remainders to their first and other sons in tail male; and that the remainder in fee was neither limited or intended to go to any of them, or to any issue which they might have, none of them having issue at that time, but was limited to the right heirs of the grantor, and was a separate and distinct interest, which neither Oliver, Peter, or Francis Neve could claim by the course of the settlement. Besides, it was absolutely impossible to say, for which of the Neves Norris was a trustee, whether for Oliver the first taker, or for Peter or Francis, or their sons, or for all of them, jointly or separately, and in what proportions; or whether in fee, or in tail, or for lives; or whether altogether, or in succession, according to their original limitations; and if in succession, what should become of the reversion in fee again, which still remained as it was before. Nor could there be any ground of trust shewn for Oliver or Peter, under whom alone the appellants could claim; but what would hold equally, and perhaps stronger for Francis, who was the nearest to the reversion, but under whom the appellants could derive no right.

That the appellants had attempted to resemble this case, to the case of trustees renewing terms of years for their own benefit; but the cases totally differed, not only in the respects before-mentioned, but in this essential point; that the equity on which those cases all depend, is the supposed tenant-right, or expectation, and the known usage of renewal, which was intended to be united with, and become part of the trust estate; but here it was the very reverse, it being so far from the view of the grantor that the reversion should go to the particular precedent owners, that his intent was to keep it out of their hands, and carry it into another channel. As to the pretence of an unequal consideration, and the fraud supposed to arise from thence, there was no rule of computation by which this could be shewn to be too small; and it was in fact a [88] greater consideration, than Peter himself gave for a much nearer reversion; but whatever colour could be given for such a charge, it could afford no equity to the appellants, unless it could be shewn, that a fraud upon one man can create a trust for another; or that Norris's purchasing the reversion at an under value from the blacksmith, made him a trustee, not for the vendor of the reversion, but for the owner of the particular estate which preceded it. That it was now above 64 years since the purchase of this reversion by old Norris; and if the family of the Neves thought there had been any fraud or breach of trust, there could be no doubt of their inclination and ability to make it appear; and if, after such a long acquiescence, the appellants were to be permitted to bring a bill, in the nature of a bill of review, it would create endless vexation and delay, from which the appellants would derive a very unjust advantage; for after this distance of time, it would be impossible for the respondent, who was the great-grandson of John Norris, the purchaser, to clear up many facts, which might have been easily proved and explained, if disputed while the parties to those transactions had been living. It was therefore hoped, that the order would be affirmed, and the appeal dismissed with costs.

Accordingly, after hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the same should be dismissed; and the order therein complained of, affirmed. (Jour. vol. 26. p. 367.)