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hand, the respondent's claim should appear to be well founded, the appellant could have no just cause to complain of any inconvenience, which might be consequential of such claim. The general practice of Courts of Equity, in not entertaining suits for establishing legal titles before they have been tried at law, is founded upon clear reasons; and the departing from that practice when there is no necessity for so doing, would be subversive of the legal and constitutional distinctions between the different jurisdictions of Courts of Law and Equity and though the admission of a party in a suit is conclusive as to matters of fact, or may deprive him of the benefit of a privilege, which, if insisted on, would exempt him from the jurisdiction of the court, yet no admission of parties can change the law, or give jurisdiction to a court in a cause of which it hath no jurisdiction. Agreeably hereto. the established and universal practice of Courts of Equity is to dismiss the plaintiff's bill, if it appears to be grounded on a title merely legal, and not cognizable by them; notwithstanding the defendant has answered the bill, and insisted on matter of title. And it can make no difference, whether the legal title be insisted on by the answer, or by the plea. That nothing hath a greater tendency to introduce uncertainty in the law, than the giving way to new exceptions to general, settled, and known rules of practice in Courts of Justice; and therefore no such exceptions ought to be allowed, but upon the clearest grounds. The general known practice of Courts of Equity has been to dismiss bills brought, like the present, for establishing a legal title, and for a perpetual injunction, before such title has been tried or determined at law. The exceptions to this general rule of practice are but very few, well known, and founded on strong and clear reasons: but the appellant's case fell not within any of these exceptions, and consequently ought to be governed by the general rule. The bill was entirely new, and without a precedent. It stated a case proper enough for a bill to perpetuate evidence, and had it stopped there, it would have been free from objection; for such bills ought not hy the course of proceedings in Courts of Equity, to pray relief, or be brought to a hearing. But the appellant's bill was not [43] only to perpetuate evidence, but also prayed relief, and was brought to hearing; and therefore the dismission of it with costs, was warranted by the constant practice of the Court.

After hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the same should be dismissed, and the decree therein complained of, affirmed. (MS. Jour. sub anno 1772–3. p. 158.)

Thomas Symons, the plaintiff in the original cause and defendant in error, for many years before and in the year 1739, transacted business with the plaintiff Par-