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the 5th of April 1768, he, as lord of the said manor, did appoint a game-keeper thereof, and procured such appointment to be registered with the clerk of the peace; and that he was entitled, as lord of the manor, to hold courts for the same: and the respondent also admitted, that soon after his appointment of a game-keeper for the said manor, the appellant by letter requested him to withdraw such appointment, and to disclaim any right or title to the manor; but the respondent refused to comply with that request: and that the respondent being, about Easter 1768, informed of the appellant's first pretensions to be lord of the said manor, and of his holding [41] courts within the same, did forbid his the respondent's tenants from attending and doing service at such pretended courts.

On the 27th of July 1770, this plea was argued before the Lords Commissioners of the great seal, when their Lordships were of opinion, that the respondent's plea, as to so much of the bill as sought a discovery how, and in what manner, and from whom, and by virtue of what deeds or writings the respondent claimed or derived his right or title to the said manor; and that such deeds or writings might be set forth, or left with the respondent's clerk in court, for the inspection and perusal of the appellant and his agents, was good and sufficient; and that the rest of the plea was insufficient, and therefore ordered the same to be over-ruled.

The appellant afterwards filed a replication to the plea and answer; and the cause being at issue, a commission issued in the usual manner for examination of witnesses, and witnesses were examined on both sides; and publication having passed, the said cause was set down for hearing; and on the 3d of June 1771, was heard before the Lord Chancellor Apsley, when an objection was taken by the respondent's counsel, that there was no equity in the bill; and this objection having been fully argued, and the respondent's counsel refusing to take an issue by consent, or to admit a trespass, whereby the right to the manor might be tried at law, his Lordship on the 18th of the same month, was pleased to order, that the plaintiff's bill should be dismissed, with costs.

From this decree the present appeal was brought; and on behalf of the appellant it was said (E. Thurlow, A. Wedderburn), that as the apparent consequence of the respondent's persisting to appoint game-keepers for the manor in question, was, that evidence would be created for future times for a title in him to the manor, it was too much against conscience, and too injurious to the appellant, to be unworthy of the interposition of a Court of Equity, if the respondent had not a just title; and therefore it was fit, that the justice of his claim should be tried and determined by the assistance of a Court of Equity, the appellant being without remedy at law. That the plea having been over-ruled, and consequently held by the court to be no bar to the relief prayed; and having been allowed as to the discovery, supposing it to be true, and the truth of it having been controverted and put in issue by the replication, the only point brought before the court at the hearing, was the truth or falsehood of the plea; and therefore, it ought then to have been over-ruled as false, if not proved to be true; or have been sent as an issue at law to be tried by a jury, if the evidence was doubtful, or the fact which was in issue upon the plea, properly triable in that manner.

On the other side it was contended (G. Hill, R. Jackson), that the appellant's bill was brought for establishing his title to the manor of Denton, and for a perpetual injunction. His title appeared by the bill to be merely legal. Such suits are never entertained by a Court of Equity, unless there are particular circumstances stated in the bill, showing the necessity of the Court's interposition, either for pre-[42]-venting multiplicity of suits, or other vexation, or for preventing an injustice irremediable by a Court of Law. That no such circumstances were even suggested by the present bill; there could not in this case be any pretence for vexation, or multiplicity of suits, for none but the appellant and respondent were concerned in the question; and as to injustice, if the appellant had received any injury, there was no impediment to his maintaining an action at law. As to the apprehensions suggested by the bill, of a possibility of future inconvenience or injury from the respondent's claim, they were not only remote, but altogether like the apprehensions which arise on every common legal claim before it is tried; and if such claim should be, as it was suggested to be, groundless, these apprehensions were imaginary, and therefore not a sufficient cause for maintaining a suit in equity to remove them. But if, on the other