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dent's witnesses, said, he was sent for to marry them, and that the appellant told him, he had been married the day before, but he did not recollect what year this was in. Besides, the respondent's attempting to support her pretended marriage by fictitious and forged evidence, were clear proofs against the reality of it. That cohabitation and acknowledgment of marriage may be sufficient, as between the reputed husband and the creditors of the supposed wife, to oblige him to pay her debts; but would not be good as between him and her, to entitle her to dower out of his estate. And in this case, where the question was between the reputed husband and wife, evidence of cohabitation and acknowledgment was not sufficient for the Court of Chancery, if it had jurisdiction at all, to found a decree for alimony. The time when it was solemnized, the place where, and the person by whom the marriage was performed, ought to be fully and indisputably proved; and where the marriage was denied, the Court of Chancery, until it was clearly established, could have no jurisdiction to set aside the agreement of November 1762; for if there was no marriage, there could be no constraint or force in the execution of that agreement.

But supposing an actual marriage, the Court of Chancery has no original jurisdiction in cases of alimony, that being properly cognizable in the Spiritual Court; or if the Court of Chancery has any such jurisdiction, yet the marriage in this case being denied, that jurisdiction could not be exercised; from the obvious inconvenience, that should the Ecclesiastical Court, in a cause of jactitation of marriage, determine there was no marriage, the decree of the Court of Chancery would still be binding, though in manifest wrong of the appellant, or any other man in his circumstances. Besides this, the respondent, by her misbehaviour, had forfeited all pretence to relief in equity. That the granting leases by the appellant and respondent as man and wife, was accounted for by the reputation of their marriage, which was to be uniformly kept up; and the fine being levied was merely to satisfy the parties, who insisted upon this measure for the security of their settlement, under the mistaken idea of a subsisting marriage [26] which the appellant could not then disavow, without falsifying his repeated declarations; nor did his discovering it now, tend in any manner to destroy or weaken the effect of the fine, with respect to those for whose benefit the uses of it were declared.

On the part of the respondent it was contended (F. Norton, A. Wedderburn), that her marriage was established by every imaginable circumstance; and the deed of separation itself, which was sought to be set aside, was conclusive against the appellant as to the fact of the marriage, which he had been induced to dispute by the same artifices, that had prevailed upon him to treat the respondent in the barbarous manner he had done. But a mere denial of the marriage under such circumstances, and opposed by a course of twenty years public cohabitation, could not even raise a doubt upon the question. The respondent's bill was filed to set aside a deed, extorted from her by the most infamous means, of which the Court of Chancery undoubtedly had cognizance: the husband in his answer had declared, that he never would cohabit with her; the reference to the Master to enquire what would he proper to be allowed for her maintenance, and the subsequent order of the 22d of November 1766, were consequential to the original relief; and it would have been absurd in such a case, to have turned the respondent round to sue in another jurisdiction for alimony; especially as the Court had done no more in this case, than it would have done upon a supplicavit, where the husband had refused to maintain his wife. That the Court had as yet made no order with regard to the quantum of maintenance, and as to the £200 directed to be paid to the respondent by the order of November 1766, it could not be thought too large, either with respect to the appellant's fortune, or the respondent's condition; who had lost by his misconduct her own separate fortune, and been for above four years destitute of any provision, and engaged in a most expensive litigation. As therefore the decree and order were equitable and just, and the appeal frivolous, vexatious, and oppressive, it ought to be dismissed with most exemplary costs.

Accordingly, after hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the same should be dismissed, and the decree and order therein complained of, affirmed; and it was further ordered, that the appellant should pay the respondent £200 for her costs in respect of the said appeal. (Jour. vol. 31. p. 604.)