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I BROWN.
DE GOLS v. WARD [1737]

and as much time was spent in making the award, it must be presumed, that they took the bonds into their consideration. The proof of this was unnecessary, but that which had been given confirmed the presumption: the respondent's witness, Reilly, had specified several bonds, which he believed were laid before the arbitrators, amongst which were the two bonds executed by the respondent, Ecklin and Murray; and the appellant's witness, who was one of the arbitrators, would not say that these two bonds were not laid before them, but believed that what they did was right. As to the appellant's objection, that if the two bonds were in contemplation of the arbitrators, they would have ascertained the sum due thereon by their award, and directed those bonds to have been delivered up; the inference was unwarrantable, as the sum awarded to the appellant was a balance due to him upon all matters in dispute. The two bonds in question were given for securing rent due from Ecklin, which might appear to the arbitrators to have been afterwards satisfied, or that from the appellant's subsequent transactions with Ecklin, the respondent was not any farther liable on those bonds; but not being referees of the appellant's demands upon Ecklin, they might not think proper to direct the bonds to be delivered up. It was plainly unnecessary in their opinions minutely to specify every transaction, and though they directed the securities to be delivered up, wherein the respondent was more immediately concerned, they nevertheless omitted to specify matters of less moment; for they did not ascertain how they included the money paid by the respondent, nor take any notice of a replevin bond given for the return of distresses taken by the appellant, though these were matters undoubtedly submitted to them. Besides, Mr. O'Callaghan, the arbitrator, in his deposition said, that if the sum due on the two bonds in question was in contemplation, he could not say that the arbitrators would have ascertained the same, or have directed those bonds to have been delivered up. With respect to the costs directed to be paid by the appellant, he could have no reason to complain; as they would be but a small recompence to the respondent, for the damages he had sustained by the appellant's withholding possession after the award, and his subsequent vexatious ejectments and distresses. [536] The respondent had more reason to apprehend, that the decree had been too unfavourable, in directing him to pay costs as to the several applications for rent; for had the appellant immediately complied with the award, those applications and all further proceedings would have been unnecessary; but the appellant's withholding possession contrary to the award, and the oppressions which he afterwards accumulated on the respondent, rendered it impossible to liquidate any account. It seemed therefore hard, that the respondent should pay any costs. And the appellant being well aware, that there would be a large balance of costs against him, which in case of the death of either party before payment would be lost, it was therefore his view, as well by the present appeal, as by every other means, to delay the taxation of costs.

After hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the same should be dismissed, and the decrees therein complained of, affirmed and it was further ordered, that the appellant should pay the respondent £200 for his costs in respect of the said appeal. (MS. Jour. sub anno 1770. p. 114.)



BANKRUPT.

Case 1.—Conrade de Gols, and another,—Appellants; Knox Ward, and others,—Respondents [23d February 1737].

[This case is now obsolete. Acts of bankruptcy are now defined exhaustively by the Bankruptcy Acts 1883 (46 and 47 Vict. c. 52) s. 4 and 1890 (53 and 54 Vict. c. 71) s. 1.]
The committing a secret act of bankruptcy before the petitioning creditor's debt accrued, will not invalidate the commission sued out by him.—In what case a secret act of bankruptcy shall overturn all subsequent conveyances made by the bankrupt, to the prejudice of his just creditors.

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