Page:The English Reports v1 1900.pdf/752

and give up the vouchers by the first day of the then next term, the bill should be dismissed. And these conditions not being complied with, the Court, on the 28th of February following, ordered, that the defendant should be at liberty to inrol the decree of dismission; which he accordingly did, and soon afterwards died, having by his will appointed the present respondents his executors.

From this decree the plaintiff appealed; insisting (T. Lutwyche, N. Lechmere), that it appeared to the Court, by full proof, that no other matter came before the umpire, or was determined by him, than the brewing trade; that the reason why he did not, by his award, direct releases to be given, was, because he had examined no matters, nor heard any proofs, but what related entirely to the brewing trade; and that this appeared clearly from the deposition of the umpire himself, which was not in the least contradicted by any proof advanced on the part of the respondents. That there was no sufficient evidence to prove the least intent of extinguishing any other demand, than what related to the brewing trade only; on the contrary, Bennett acknowledged, both, before and after the award, that the appellant had several other demands upon him, which were not included in the award; and therefore it was hard to deprive the appellant of his proper remedy, touching those other demands, which, in fact, amounted to £800 and upwards.

On the other side it was said (S. Dodd, J. Baynes), that, previous to the appeal, several orders had been made in the Court below, by the consent of the appellant and respondents, for referring the matters excepted in the release; but that the appellant, instead of proceed-[530]-ing on such reference, had appealed from the decree; hoping thereby to establish a very stale demand, and to draw the respondents into a perplexed and intricate account, who were mere strangers to all the transactions, and deprived of all the vouchers and papers proper for their defence.

Accordingly, after hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the appeal should be dismissed, and the decree therein complained of, affirmed; and that the appellant should pay to the respondents the sum of £40 for their costs. (Jour. vol. 19. p. 592.).

In June 1745, the respondent filed his bill in the Court of Chancery in Ireland, against the appellant, Dame Abigail his then wife, and Jane Jackson her sister, stating several matters of account between the appellant and respondent, which had arisen from transactions between them as landlord and tenant, and various oppressions by the appellant, and containing (among others) the following charges: that the appellant, taking upon himself a right to set the lands of Ardlonan and Marvelstown in the county of Meath, which were the estate of Dame Abigail his wife, and Jane Jackson her sister, did, on the 12th of May 1738, sign two agreements with the respondent and Hugh Ecklin, by one of which he demised to them Ardlonan and Dressoge for three lives, at the yearly rent of 9s. 8d. per acre, and by the other he demised to them Marvelstown for the like term and rent; and that the respondent and Ecklin were to enjoy those two farms and lands separately, although they jointly agreed for security of the rent; Ecklin being to enjoy Marvelstown, and the respondent Ardlonan and Dressoge. That disputes afterwards arose between the appellant, the respondent, and Ecklin, concerning arrears of