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the real estates, and chattels real of the late Lord Coleraine, delivered to his Majesty, together with all the deeds, evidences, and writings relating thereto; the appellant demurred and for causes of demurrer shewed, 1st, That the title of his Majesty to the said estates, if any he had, was a title merely at law, without any circumstance or ingredient to entitle him to the assistance of a Court of Equity. 2dly, That she was not bound to betray her own title to the said estates, or any of them; and therefore his Majesty was not entitled to a discovery from her, whether she was an alien born. 3dly, That it did not appear, that his Majesty had any estate in the premises in the information mentioned, nor could any act to be done by the Court give his Majesty any estate therein; and therefore his Majesty was not entitled to any assistance from the Court, until he had gained an estate by the ordinary course of law.

And as to so much of the information, as sought to compel the appellant to discover whether the defendant Henrietta Rosa Peregrina Hare was an alien born out of the liegeance of the Crown of Great-Britain, and whatever else tended to such discovery, the appellant also demurred; and for causes of demurrer shewed, that as to the several matters last mentioned, his Majesty's Attorney General, for and on the behalf of his Majesty, might, when a proper course of proceeding should be had to assert his Majesty's title to the estates mentioned in the information to have been devised to the said Henrietta Rosa Peregrina, and such title should be found, examine her the said appellant to prove the same; and, therefore, as to those matters, the Attorney General, or his Majesty, were not entitled to have any discovery from her in any other manner.

This demurrer was argued in the Court of Exchequer, by [419] counsel on both sides, for several days in Michaelmas term 1751; and on the 12th of February following, the Court gave judgment, and were unanimously of opinion, that the demurrer ought to be over-ruled; and accordingly ordered that the same should be over-ruled, with 40s. costs.

From this order the appellant appealed, and on her behalf it was argued (A. Hume Campbell, E. Starkie, R. Ord, G. Perrot), that every person taking by devise, is in law a purchaser; and the incapacity of an alien to hold an estate which he hath purchased, is in the nature of a penalty upon him, or a forfeiture of his interest; and by the known laws of the land, no man can be examined to, nor is bound to disclose, what will subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. That his Majesty having no title or estate in the premises, at the time the information in the Exchequer was exhibited, no act to be done by that Court could give him any estate therein; and therefore the information was premature, and the order for overruling the demurrer ought for these reasons to be reversed.

On behalf of the Crown it was contended (D. Ryder, T. Bootle), that by the known law of the land, no alien born can take by grant, devise, or other purchase, any freehold, or chattels real, for his own benefit; but can and does, in such cases, take for the benefit of the Crown. That the known method of recovering such estates for the Crown, is by a commission under the great seal to inquire into the facts; and on the inquest finding them, to seize the estate into the King's hands. And, that in order to prove the facts on which it is founded, the King has the same right to a discovery by the assistance of a Court of Equity, as the subject has, and founded on the same principle of justice, viz. that it is in general against conscience, for any one to enjoy the property of another, by concealing his right.

In the present case three distinct causes of demurrer are assigned: 1. That his Majesty's title is merely at law, without any circumstance to entitle him to the assistance of equity. This, if true, might be an objection to the relief prayed, but is certainly none to the discovery, and would destroy the most settled rule of a Court of Equity; which by daily experience compels a discovery, where the relief can be had only at law, and on purpose to enable the plaintiff to recover at law. 2. That the appellant is not bound to betray her own title. But if by betraying is meant discovering, it takes the question for granted, and contradicts the known general rule. If by betraying is meant a particular sort of discovery, in a case within some exception to the general rule, the exception should be specified; the only one mentioned at the bar, was the case of a fact importing a crime, [420] or which, would subject the party to a penalty or forfeiture. The exception is admitted, but