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In consequence of this, the defendant in error in Michaelmas term 1786, signed final judgment on the postea in the said action, for the whole of his demand; and his costs in the action were taxed at £192 15s. ld.

[411] To reverse this judgment the present writ of error was brought, and on the 15th of May 1787, Justice Buller came personally into the House, and acknowledged his seal put to the bill of exceptions, pursuant to the requisition of the usual writ for that purpose.

The errors assigned by the Company were, 1st, That the Justice before whom the issues joined between the parties were tried, declared and delivered his opinion to the jury upon that occasion, that the damage which had happened to such goods as were wet and damaged by or from storms, was not ship damage within the meaning of the charter party. 2dly. That the verdict upon all the several issues joined was given for the defendant in error, whereas, by the law of the land, a verdict on the two last issues joined, ought to have been for the plaintiffs in error. 3dly, That the judgment was given for the defendant in error, whereas, by the law of the land, it ought to have been given for the plaintiffs in error. The defendant in error put in the usual plea, in nullo est erratum.

On behalf of the plaintiffs in error it was contended (G. Rous, E. Law), that the meaning of any particular covenant in a deed, ought not to be collected merely from the terms of such covenant taken by itself, as detached from the rest of the deed, but from a comparison of it with all the other provisions of the same deed, respecting the same subject, and that such construction ought ultimately to be adopted, as without violating the natural sense of any one part, gives the most uniform, entire, and consistent meaning to the whole. That the words ship damage seemed to be construed more according to the natural sense, when they were made to mean generally damage happening on board a ship, than when they were confined to such damage as arises from the insufficiency of the ship, and also from another cause perfectly collateral to the ship itself, viz. the negligence of the master, which latter cause of damage the defendant in error, it was supposed, would contend to be comprehended within the term ship damage. That by a clause in the charter party, prior to that in which ship damage is mentioned, it is expressly provided, that the East India Company should, on delivery into their warehouses in England, be at liberty to refuse any part of the homeward-bound cargo found to be prejudiced, wet, or damnified by any occasion or accident whatever, and should in such case be intitled to demand the invoice prices, and all charges upon such goods from the part owners of the chartered ship, which words, "any occasion or accident whatsoever," in their general and ordinary sense, obviously comprehend every sort of damage received by such homeward cargo, as well prior to the time of its being shipped, as the damage afterwards sustained by it whilst on board. That the intention of the parties, in framing the subsequent clause in which ship damage is mentioned, appears to have been merely this, to exempt the owners of the ships from being liable for such injuries as the cargo should receive prior to the time of the shipping of the same, leaving all such other injuries as it should afterwards receive on board the ship to be made [412] good by the owners, under the name of ship damage; and the term itself evidently points at a distinction between damage received by goods before shipping, or what is usually called country damage, and what they should suffer afterwards on board a ship. That to construe the words ship damage in the latter clause, as meaning such damage only as might arise from the insufficiency of the ship, or negligence of the master, would destroy the whole effect of the former provision in the charter party, by which the ship owners were made liable for wet and damaged goods, in as much as it would leave them responsible only in the single case of negligence, in which case they were before liable at common law, as every other common carrier is, independent of any express contract on the subject.

The criterion by which ship damage was directed to be ascertained, viz. the condition and appearance of the package of the goods, evidently shewed what the parties meant by the term ship damage. It might very well be collected from the condition and appearance of the package of the goods, whether the damage happened before or after the shipping of the goods, but it would be utterly impossible to infer from thence, whether the salt-water, by which the goods were wetted on