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found in a very weak state both in body and mind; it was also proved on the part of the appellant, that William Roots' death was occasioned by the accident which happened to him, he being before in good health.

On the part of the respondents there were not any witnesses examined to prove, that William Roots laid out any money upon the two houses contained in the agreement, after his purchase thereof for £250; but two witnesses examined on their part deposed, that the two messuages were, as they believed, worth to be sold £806 8s. they computing the value thereof at twenty-four years purchase, upon the gross rents of sixteen guineas each, at which the same were let; and the respondents proved, that William Roots attained the age of sixty, in or about the month of August preceding the agreement; and two witnesses examined on their part deposed, that an annuity of £70 for the life of a person aged sixty-one, ought to be purchased for £589 8s. allowing the purchaser interest at £4 per cent. the witnesses making such their calculation agreeable to the principles of Dr. Halley, adopted by De Moivre and Simpson. But no proof was made on the part of the respondents, that William Roots and the appellant had ever altered their intentions in relation to the agreement; on the contrary, it was proved by the appellant, that William Roots, some time after the execution thereof, told the tenant of one of the houses, that he was to pay his rent for the future to the appellant.

On the 22d of May 1773, the cause was heard before the Lord Chancellor Bathurst, when his Lordship was pleased to order, that the appellant's bill, so far as it sought a specific performance of the agreement, dated the 16th of July 1770, should stand dismissed without costs; and that it should be referred to the Master, to take an account of what was due to the appellant and the respondent Pope, his trustee, for principal and interest on the assignment of the mortgage, and to tax the appellant and the respondent Pope their costs, so far as related to such mortgage; and that upon the respondents, or any or either of them, paying to the appellant what should be reported due to him for principal, interest, and costs, and to the respondent Pope what should be taxed for his costs, within six months after the Master should make his report, at such time and place as the Master should appoint, the appellant and respondent Pope should re-convey the mortgaged premises, free and clear of all incumbrances done by them, or either of [375] them, or those under whom they claimed, and should deliver upon oath all deeds, papers, and writings, in their custody or power relating thereto, to the respondents, or such of them as should redeem the appellant as aforesaid, or to whom he or they should appoint. But in default of such payment, they were to stand foreclosed.

From so much of this decree as dismissed the appellant's bill, as to the specific performance of the agreement, he appealed; insisting (A. Wedderburn, C. Robinson), that in a Court of Equity, every complete agreement is considered as if it were actually performed at the time fixed by the parties for the execution of it; and in this case, the agreement was to all intents and purposes complete. The equitable title vested in the appellant, upon the execution of it; he was to receive the rents and profits from the 1st of April preceding; the payment of the annuity commenced at the same time; in short, nothing remained to be done, but the conveyance of the legal estate, which was prevented by mere accident: and the time for doing it having elapsed before the death of Roots, the relief prayed against his representatives was merely of course, unless such a fraud could have been imputed to the agreement, as would have entitled Roots himself to impeach it. If instead of Roots, the appellant had died, Roots would clearly have been entitled to a decree against the devisee or heir of the appellant, for a performance of the agreement; and it was difficult to conceive, that a contract should be binding upon the representatives of one of the parties, and not equally binding upon the representatives of the other. If the validity of a contract about any uncertain interest was to be decided by the event, no such contract, however fair between the parties, or with whatever deliberation it was conducted, could ever be secure; and there was no reason for deciding so in the case of an annuity, which would not hold with equal or greater force, in the case of any other bargain, in the most ordinary articles of commerce, where the advantage on one side might be very great by the sudden alteration of price. That the defence originally attempted by the pleadings in this cause was, that the parties had varied from their former agree-