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The appellant, by his answer to this bill, insisted upon the benefit of the articles in 1692, and that he had never seen or been made acquainted with, or had the least notice of them, at the time of his being drawn in to execute the settlement in 1718; that as his title under the articles was not disclosed, but industriously concealed, the settlement of 1718 was a fraud upon him, and he was not to be bound thereby, nor obliged to make any settlement upon the respondent Margaret.

The cause being at issue, and witnesses examined, was heard upon the 28th, 30th, and 31st of May 1733, and the Court having taken time to consider thereof, were afterwards, upon the 26th of June following, pleased to order and decree, that the appellant should, by sufficient deeds, convey to and settle on the respondent Margaret, so much of the said premises as should in the whole amount to the clear yearly value of £200, to be by her held and enjoyed as a jointure, for and during the term of her natural life; and that the appellant should account with her for the arrears of the said £200 since the death of his father; and that it should be referred to the Chief Remembrancer to state and audit the said account.

From this decree the present appeal was brought; and on behalf of the appellant it was insisted (N. Fazakerly, W. Hamilton), that he was drawn in, by fraud and concealment of the articles of 1692, to join in the settlement of 1718, and ought not therefore to be bound by it. That by this settlement, John Jevers had only a power to limit any particular parcel of the lands therein mentioned, not exceeding £200 a year, as a jointure, but he had never made use of that power, or executed any deed for that purpose; and it seemed unreasonable to compel the appellant to make a settlement, which his father, who had the power, never thought fit to do. That the bond being only conditioned for the settlement of a jointure of £200 without referring to any particular estate out of which such a provision was to be made, ought not to create any real or specific lien upon the lands comprised in the articles, under which the [275] appellant appeared to be a purchaser for a valuable and meritorious consideration. Besides, the respondent Margaret relied upon this bond, without having any deed executed pursuant to the power in the settlement, and therefore she ought to claim a satisfaction out of the testator's personal estate; and if she gave credit, as it was apprehended she ought, for what she had already received, she would have more than an adequate satisfaction for her demand under the bond. It was therefore prayed, that the decree might be reversed.

On the part of the respondent Margaret, it was contended (D. Ryder, J. Browning), that she was a purchaser for a valuable consideration of her jointure of £200 a year; and that not only by her marriage, which alone has always been esteemed a sufficient consideration, but also by her personal and leasehold estates. That Courts of Equity constantly decree the execution of powers in favour of purchasers, not only against the persons who for valuable considerations agree to execute them, but against those in remainder also; and as the bond ought to be considered as an equitable execution of the power, it ought to be made effectual by the assistance of a Court of Equity; and especially, as it appeared by the ingrossment of the deed, that the testator had not only an intention to execute the power legally, but had likewise fixed upon the particular lands to be settled for that purpose. That by the dates of the settlement and bond, both being on the same day, and by the draft of the deed prepared by the testator's direction, it appeared that the intention of the parties to the marriage agreement was, that it should be performed by an execution of his power; and therefore it was hoped that the decree would appear to be right and just, and consequently be affirmed.

But, after hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the decree complained of should be reversed, and that the respondent Margaret's bill, as against the appellant, should be dismissed: and it was further ordered, that it should be referred to the Deputy Remembrancer of the said Court of Exchequer, to compute interest for £2000, the penalty of the bond given by the appellant's father, conditioned to settle a jointure of £200 per ann. on the respondent Margaret, from the time of filing the said bill, and to tax her costs in the said court; and that the said sum of £2000 and the interest thereof and costs should be paid to her by the respondents the executors, out of his personal estate, in a course of administration; and in case they should not admit assets, it was further ordered, that it should be referred to the said Deputy Remembrancer, to take an account of the