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contract of the 17th of November 1696, and good ground to believe that the hand of Lord Powerscourt had been counterfeited: and the cause coming afterwards to be heard on the 27th of January 1721, before the Lord Chancellor, the appellant's counsel offered to read several new proofs taken in this cause, against the validity of the said alledged deed of November 1696, but his Lordship refused to admit any such new proof, alledging, that the verdict found in the life-time of the Lord Powerscourt was obligatory on the appellant; and therefore his Lordship was pleased to decree, that the appellant should execute a lease for three lives of the premises to the respondent, pursuant to the said articles of the 17th of November 1696; and that the said Thomas Richardson and the appellant should account with the respondent for the rent reserved upon the lease made to Richardson, over and above the rent payable by the respondent, from the commencement of the said lease; and that Richardson should, from time to time, account with and pay to the respondent, his heirs and assigns, the surplus rent reserved on the said lease, over and above the £418 payable by the respondent; and decreed costs against the appellant, but dismissed the bill as to the setting aside Richardson's lease, without costs.

By a subsequent order of the 9th of April 1722, it was referred to a Master to prepare and settle the draft of a lease, to be executed by the appellant, pursuant to the said decree. Which draft the Master accordingly settled, and thereby the appellant was made to covenant, that the respondent should enjoy the demised premises, freed and discharged from all leases and incumbrances whatsoever.

From this decree, and all the other orders, the appellant appealed; insisting (R. Raymond, S. Mead), that in a cause of such consequence, the trial ought to have been at bar, and by a jury of the proper county; and that a new trial ought to have been granted, as the contract insisted upon was liable to several objections, and appeared suspicious from many circumstances and positive oaths. Besides, this contract, if any such really existed, was voluntary and without consideration, lay dormant for many years, and was never in-[205]-sisted on by Mr. Chappel, with whom it was supposed to have been made; and therefore the appellant's plea ought to have been allowed, and the bill in consequence to have been dismissed. That the respondent by his new bill, admitted that the proceedings in the former suit were abated by the death of Lord Powerscourt, and could not regularly be revived against the appellant; and therefore those proceedings, so abated, could never serve as a foundation for decreeing a specific performance against the appellant, who did not claim either as heir or representative of the Lord Powerscourt. That the respondent having brought an original bill against the appellant, and witnesses having been examined on both sides, the appellant ought to have had the benefit of the depositions taken in this cause; and the new evidence against the validity of the alledged contract ought to have been admitted, that the Court might judge whether there was not sufficient ground to direct a new trial. That the appellant ought not to be bound by the verdict found against Lord Powerscourt in his life-time; and though the contract had been free from all suspicion, yet a specific performance thereof ought not to have been decreed against the appellant, who did not claim by descent from Lord Powerscourt, but under the deed and fine of 1662; and the rather, because a specific execution was in this case become impracticable through the fault of the respondent, who let the supposed contract lie dormant, without giving Mr. Richardson any notice thereof, though the treaty between him and Lord Powerscourt was carried on with the respondent's privity; so that there was no reason for a court of equity to interpose, but the respondent ought to have been left to seek his remedy at law against Lord Powerscourt's representatives, who had sufficient assets; and it was humbly apprehended, that there was no reason to decree a specific performance even against Lord Powerscourt, but that the respondent ought to have been sent to law, to recover his damages against him in an action of covenant on the said alledged deed or articles; and therefore it was hoped, that the several orders would be reversed, and the respondent's bill dismissed.

On the other side it was said (T. Lutwyche, C. Talbot), that the trial was in the long vacation, that Lord Powerscourt had occasioned great delay, and was in a very decaying condition; and that, for these and other reasons, the Court was induced to put the cause off till the then next assizes. That the jury was so far from being of an improper county, that the county first named was altered to the county of