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agreement was made void; and that, being a refugee, he ought to have the benefit of the laws of England, which give the whole personal estate to the husband; and ought not to be governed by the laws of France, or custom of Paris, by which he was persecuted, and had lost a real and personal estate of no less value than 10,600 livres.

On the 26th of November 1702, the cause was heard before the Lord Keeper Wright; and on the 11th of December following, his Lordship decreed the 800 livres to the plaintiffs, with interest from the death of the defendant's wife, according to the marriage-contract; and referred it to a Master to take an account of the value of the said 800 livres, and to compute interest on the same, from the death of the defendant's wife. And as to the residue, being the estate in common between the defendant and his wife, his Lordship declared,

that the marriage-contract, as to such part, amounted to no more than a declaration, that the said residue should go according to the custom of Paris, in the same manner as it would have gone if no such contract had been made; and, if the defendant and his wife had continued there, the custom of Paris would have effected the same thing, without such agreement, as by the agreement as to the residue was declared; whereby the agreement could be of no force, it being the same with the custom, and therefore, as to so much, his Lordship dismissed the bill.

From this decree the plaintiffs appealed; and on their behalf it was argued (J. Ayloffe), that, although where the parties to a marriage depend upon the law or custom of the place where they marry, which custom, or the effect of it, will not follow or bind them in another country; yet, all lawful contracts, as well of marriage, as relative to any thing else, ought to be fully performed between the parties and their representatives, according to the apparent [131] intent of such contracts, notwithstanding any change of habitation; and although such contract, to avoid reciting the custom of any place at large, refers only to such custom, so far as it relates to a particular part of the estate intended to be settled; yet that part of the contract having reference to the custom, ought to be performed as well as the other, wheresoever the contracting parties remove their dwelling; the marriage not having proceeded on the custom in general, but on an express contract, wherein the custom operated only by the agreement and admission of the parties; who, as to a part of their substance, incorporated the terms of their custom into their agreement. That these articles ought the rather to have been decreed to be performed in toto, because the parties had thereby waived or derogated from the custom of Paris in the following instances: 1st, By the city laws, or custom of Paris, the respective debts of the husband and wife, contracted before marriage, are afterwards to be paid out of the community; but here it was expressly agreed, that the debts of each party should be paid out of each party's own estate. 2dly, Where there is no contract in writing to the contrary, the whole estate of both parties is to be in common; but, in this case, it was agreed, that only one-third of the portion should enter into the community. 3dly, All such estate, as during the marriage falls either to the husband or wife, is, by the custom, to be in common; whereas here it was agreed, that whatever should fall or come to the wife during the marriage should, if she renounced the community, go to her and her heirs, in exclusion of the husband and his heirs. And, 4thly, The heirs of the wife cannot, by the custom, renounce the community, though she herself may; but, by this contract, the heirs might renounce: by this custom also, if the wife renounces, she cannot take back what she brought; but, by the contract in question, it was expressly agreed, that she should in that case not only take back what she brought, but likewise whatever should fall to her during the marriage. It was further contended, that the right of the appellants arose from the express agreement of the parties, that there should be a community of all goods or estates, moveable or immoveable; and that the additional words, pursuant to the custom of Paris, were but explanatory of what was meant by the word community, by referring for certainty only to the custom; that this reference did not enlarge, but only interpreted, what was expressly covenanted in the foregoing words; and was as binding to the parties, and made as much one entire contract, as if the particular branches of the custom had been distinctly specified and agreed to, without mentioning the custom itself. That this was not the case of a marriage