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consideration, and by false representation of the depositions in a former cause; and therefore that instrument was fraudulent and void, and could not revoke the former presentation fairly obtained. 2dly, But supposing the bargain and sale not to be fraudulent and void, then the respondent Smith, on that supposition, was not patron at the [122] time he executed the instrument, having before conveyed away the advowson, and therefore could not then have that or any other power incident, or supposed to be incident to the right of patronage; and though the right of presentation on the then vacancy, or the power of revoking the former presentation, were choses in action, and as such not assignable by law, and therefore could not pass by the indenture to the bargainee, yet the bargainor could not claim the same against his own conveyance; and consequently, the right of revocation, if any then subsisted, must be extinct by that conveyance. But further; this instrument was obtained when the church was vacant, and under a corrupt and simoniacal agreement, as appeared by the proofs in the cause, and by some recitals in the instrument itself; therefore it was by the express words of the statute, 31 Eliz. c. 6. utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect in law; consequently it could not operate as a revocation, for if it could, it would be of some effect in law, which is contrary to the express words of the statute.

It was nevertheless objected, that a presentee has not, before institution, either jus in re, or ad rem, and consequently was incompetent to maintain any suit either in law or equity. But it was submitted, that the relief contended for fell within the general rules of equity. A presentee before institution has a right to maintain a suit in the Ecclesiastical Court by duplex querela, and may thereby obtain institution and induction; therefore he has jus ad rem, though not in re. This remedy properly lies, where the parties contending for institution, claim under the same patron, which was the present case; for the respondent Knightley Holled expressly claimed under the presentation of Smith, as well as that of Thomas Holled; and if he had claimed only under Thomas Holled, yet as he neither had or pretended to have any title to present, but what was founded on the fraudulent conveyance of 1764, and as the Court of Chancery has an original jurisdiction to relieve against fraudulent conveyances, the appellant was well entitled to the relief prayed by his bill, and ought not to be sent to another jurisdiction; and the rather, as the Bishop had, by his answer, submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. It was apprehended, that not only the person from whom a deed is fraudulently obtained, has a right to the aid of a Court of Equity for setting the same aside, but that any person affected thereby has the same right; at least so far as his interest is concerned; and consequently, that the appellant had a right to maintain the present suit pro interesse suo, especially as the respondent Smith was made a party to it, and as no objections had been or could be made against the appellant's having the benefit of his presentation, but such as were founded on the fraudulent and unwarrantable practices of the Holleds; and as no relief could be had against them at the common law, or in any Ecclesiastical Court, the appellant's case was properly cognizable and relieveable in a Court of Equity.

On the other side it was contended, (E. Thurlow, N. Grose, J. Brown) that a presentation by a lay patron, before institution, is only a letter missive to the bishop, recommending the person presented, and confers no interest what-[123]-ever. That the cases proving that any interest is conferred by the presentation of a lay patron, were founded on the citation of a case determined 31 Edward I. but this citation seems to have been totally misunderstood by Fitzherbert, in his Natura Brevium, and from him copied by some few subsequent reporters, without examining the Year-book itself; which proves the proposition above laid down, and clearly appears understood to do so by the current of the best authorities from that time to the latest decision upon the point; which being now in the fullest manner recognized by the Court of Common Pleas, the very attempt to shake a doctrine so established, was of the most dangerous consequence. There was no circumstance in the present case which could in any wise affect this general doctrine; for the instrument in question was fairly obtained, and properly executed; and if there was a foundation for the most remote suspicion of simony in any part of this transaction, it was more applicable to the appellant than to either of the Holleds; and therefore created an additional incapacity in the appellant to maintain this suit. The appellant being thus clearly without a shadow of right to the living in