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of Dublin in the choir, and to a vote and place in the chapter of the said church, did refuse to take the said oath before his admission thereunto; although to take the same, he was then and there required by the said Dean and Chapter, and doth yet refuse; for which cause, they the said Dean and Chapter did, and do refuse to admit the said Robert Dowgate to the stall of the Archdeacon of Dublin in the choir, and to a vote and place in the chapter of the said cathedral church.

This return being afterwards considered by the said Court of King's Bench in Ireland, they, in Easter term 1717, adjudged the same to be insufficient, and not good in law; and therefore ordered a peremptory mandamus, to admit the said Robert Dowgate to his said stall, vote, and place. Whereupon, in Michaelmas term 1719, the Dean and Chapter brought a writ of error in the Court of King's Bench in England; and after several arguments, that Court were unanimously of opinion, that a writ of error did not lie in this case; and therefore gave judgment, that the said writ of error should be quashed.

But to reverse both these judgments, the Dean and Chapter brought a writ of error in Parliament; and on their behalf it was argued (C. Wearg, F. Nott), as to the judgment of the Court of King's Bench in Ireland, that the statute or ordinance of the Dean and Chapter, mentioned in that return, was a very reasonable statute; being made for the good government of the said church and chapter, and to enforce canonical obedience therein; and that the oath thereby required was essentially necessary to be taken by every member of the chapter, before he was admitted to be one of the body, in order to manifest and secure his conformity to discipline and order. That it was still the more reasonable, as being what was commonly practised by other Deans and Chapters, and bodies corporate, [75] both spiritual and temporal; and that the Archdeacon, being contumacious to the said ordinances, in refusing to comply with so reasonable a request as a qualification, it was good cause for the Dean and Chapter's refusal to admit him to a stall in the choir, or vote in the chapter; and therefore the return ought to have been judged sufficient. But admitting it not to be sufficient, yet it was humbly conceived, that a peremptory mandamus ought not to have been awarded; because a mandamus was not a proper remedy in this case. For the design of granting a mandamus, was to admit a person to an office, in order to enable him to bring his action for the profits and privileges belonging to that office, and which he could not do, till he had been admitted; but in the present case, it appeared by the mandamus itself, that Dr. Dowgate was duly collated, instituted, and inducted to the archdeaconry of Dublin, and as such, if he had legally qualified himself, ought to enjoy a stall in the choir, and a voice and place in the chapter; which being privileges belonging to the archdeaconry, to which he was entitled, he might bring an action against any person who disturbed him in the enjoyment of them, as he might bring an ejectment for a house belonging to that office. And as to the judgment of the Court of King's Bench in England, it was conceived, that a writ of error lies upon a judgment on a mandamus, as well as on any other judgment; since otherwise, the subjects would be deprived of the benefit of appeal, in cases where their liberties and properties were very much concerned; and in no cases more, than by erroneous judgments on writs of mandamus; whereby, not only the real and personal estate and office, which every Englishman enjoys, might be much affected, but the liberties and privileges of every city and borough in Great Britain and Ireland were very highly concerned; and that therefore the Court ought not to have quashed the writ, but to have given judgment on the merits of the return.

On the other side it was contended (P. Yorke, T. Reeve), that there was no precedent or judgment to maintain, that a writ of error would lie in this case; for that in the awarding of any mandamus, it is not necessary by law, that there should be a judgment entered of ideo consideratum est, which is the constant form of entering judgments: and it might, with as good reason, be insisted, that a writ of error will lie on the award of the first, or of the alias or pluries mandamus, as upon the award of the peremptory writ; or that a writ of error will lie, upon the Court's denying a mandamus, or awarding a procedendo in any case, which, it was conceived, would not be pretended. That from the very nature of the present case, a writ of error would be vain and fruitless; for a mandamus gives no better right to the party who prosecutes it, than he had before, even though it should be