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Dickenson, who was to be indemnified by the company, and died in prison and insolvent; and that this was most equitable and agreeable to the course of Chancery in like cases: And respondent insisted, that the now members of the company represented their predecessors as to all benefit of their stock and trade; and there fore ought to pay their predecessors debts, and that the body politick and its stock is still the same; and that the new privileges given by act of parliament, only made it the more solvent, and better able to pay its debts; And that appellants were not intitled to any allowance for the 700l. paid Dickenson, because that money was paid to him for his service to appellants for other matters, viz. bringing home their gold, and in pursuing their directions during his whole voyage, and as a compensation for his being restrained from trade, as the appellants intimated when they borrowed the Hunter from his Majesty. (P. Crawford.)
Die Sabbati, 4 Martii, 1703. After hearing council on this appeal, it was adjudged by the Lords that the same should be dismissed, and the decree and orders complained of affirmed; and that the Royal African company should pay respondent Dockwra 30l. for his costs. Lords Journ. vol. xvii. p. 470. (Prec. Ch. 221. Vin. iv, 402. xv. 316.)
[332]Case 64.—The Queen,—Plaintiff; William Weedon Ford, Esq., Warden of the Fleet,—Defendant (in Error) [1703].
The Plaintiff in error stated, that in Hilary term 1699, a transcript of the record in Chancery of an inquisition, finding a forfeiture of the office of warden of the Fleet, and traverses thereof was delivered into the King's bench by the proper officer, in the name of the Lord Chancellor, with a Venire facias annexed, issuing out of Chancery of the Michaelmas term before returnable in the King's bench in Octab. Sti. Hilarii, viz. the 20th of January, with a panel of a jury returned by the Sheriff of Middlesex, to try the several traverses joined in Chancery: And that by rule of Court, the 10th of February, 1699, a trial at bar was appointed the then next term; and that the said Venire facias was quashed and vacated as irregular, and one awarded de novo by the Court of King's bench to try the several issues joined; and that this was done by consent of all parties, and so appeared by express words in the record itself; but by the delays of the respondent, the trial could not be had in Easter or Trinity term next following: And that in Michaelmas term 1700, the trial at bar came on, and a verdict was given for the Crown, after full evidence and examination of the cause; and that though the right of the cause was thus found against the respondent, he in Michaelmas term last had obtained judgment, that the plea to the inquisition, and the process thereon, were discontinued, and thereby the trial and verdict avoided and made ineffectual And Colonel Baldwin Leighton, on whose behalf this writ of error was brought, stated that the matter of the discontinuance stood thus: That the Venire facias out of Chancery, bore teste in Chancery in Michaelmas term before, and was returnable in the King's bench in Octab. St. Hilary, viz. the 20th of January; and that in the memorandum or preamble of the roll, made up by Mr. Harcourt the attorney in the Crown-office, the proper officer for [333] that purpose, it was entered, that the said transcript was delivered into the King's bench by the hands of the Lord Chancellor the third day of February; and so the objection was, that it did not appear where the record was from the 20th of January to the 3d of February, and so a discontinuance; and appellant referred to a certificate from the petty bag, to show that the record was always delivered after the return of the venire; and stated that the questions for the Lords would be these. First; whether a discontinuance or not? and appellant insisted that there was no discontinuance, Secondly; if a discontinuance, from whence it arose? whether from any default in the prosecutor or agents, or the officer of the Court, whom the prosecutor was bound to trust to in that matter? And if from the neglect or omission of such officer, or any acts of the Court, appellant insisted that the suitor ought not to be prejudiced by it; but it ought to be mended and rectified by the Court. Thirdly; if a discontinuance from either, whether amendable? And in this case appellant
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