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FIREBRACE v. MOORE [1701]
COLLES.

leaves torn out, and new ones added, and interlineations in appellant's hand writing, and not proved in the cause till 16th June, last; none of which were allowed in evidence, either before the Lords or on the last hearing: Wherefore the Barons directed the issues stated by appellant; which direction respondent insisted was just, and well founded, such matters being properly triable at law by a jury of the country, upon evidence given viva voce, and not by depositions in equity. (John Hawles.)

Die Sabbati, 20 Februarii, 1702. After hearing council, it was adjudged by the Lords, that the petition and appeal of Thomas Dent, D. D. should be dismissed, and the decretal order therein complained of be affirmed. Lords Journ. vol. xvii. p. 298.



[188]Case 39.—Sir Basil Firebrace, Knt. and Bart.,—Appellant; Arthur Moore, Esquire,—Respondent [1701].

[Mew's Dig. i. 851.]

The appellant stated, that the old East India Company, in Michaelmas term, 1695, brought a bill in Chancery against Sir Thomas Cooke, for an account, of above 100,000l. in stock and money, and made appellant a party, and charged him with a very considerable sum of money, though that money had been paid by the company to other persons, and appellant no ways accountable for it; and that that suit bad depended several years, and was vexatious and chargeable to appellant, and the occasion of great dissentions amongst the adventurers, and kept the stock low; and that therefore several adventurers often proposed an accommodation, and at length, at a general court summoned for the purpose, after full debate, an order was made, 6th July, 1699, that the matters in difference should be referred to respondent, amongst other adventurers, over whom respondent then had great influence and interest: And that appellant, at respondent's instance, furnished him with divers orders, and warrants of the company, for issuing out the money so charged against respondent, and which would have showed him no ways accountable for it, the better to enable respondent to open the case fairly to the general court, and court of committees, whereof he was one; and that respondent had declared, in the general court and otherwise, that the demand, as to appellant, was groundless and ought to be released: And that respondent, some few days after be bad so become a referee, sent James Craggs, Esq. to propose to appellant, to let him have 6000l. stock in the company, at the then market price, with liberty to pay for it at any time within a year, without interest; and that appellant at first refused, as being an advantage respondent ought not to expect; but that having just cause to suspect, that the meeting of the referees, was from time to time put off by respondent's contrivance, and that thereby the suit might be prolonged, to appellant's great charge and vexation, appellant was at last prevailed on by Craggs to sign a contract, which he brought ready drawn, dat-[189]-ed 19th July, 1699, in his own name, but in trust for respondent, viz. reciting that appellant had at Craggs' request, advanced 2520l. for the purchase of 6000l. stock; and it was thereby agreed that the 6000l. stock, should continue in appellant's name, till Craggs should pay 2520l. being at the rate of 42l. per cent, the then ready money price of stock, which Craggs covenanted to do, on or before the 19th July, 1700; and in default thereof, that appellant might sell the stock, and that if it fell short Craggs would make it up; and if sold for more, appellant to pay the overplus to Craggs, with a covenant from appellant, that in case Craggs so paid the 2520l. appellant should transfer the stock; and appellant stated, that the contract was signed and delivered to Craggs upon express condition, that in case the company did not within a month dismiss their bill, and execute a general release to appellant, the contract should be void, and re-delivered to appellant, of which condition Craggs acquainted respondent, and he consented thereto; and that the company not dismissing their bill, or executing a release within a month, Craggs came again to appellant to have the time enlarged, which was agreed to for a fortnight only,

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