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nor of any interest or estate out of lands; and though a woman of full age may agree to accept a settlement of lands from her husband, whereof he is at the time of the marriage seised of the reversion or remainder, or remainder expectant on two or more lives, or of a more remote remainder, or of a leasehold, or other personal estate, in bar of dower, which will be binding in a court of equity, though not good in law, as she was an adult, and capable of disposing of her whole real and personal estate as she pleased, yet there is no instance that an infant was ever bound by any such provision or agreement; it being well known, that the law has always considered infants as incapable of disposing of their property, either real or personal, or of binding themselves to do any act relating thereto there was therefore no foundation in equity to say, that the respondent was in all events barred of her dower by a covenant only, without any real security whatsoever for the performance of it; so that her husband might, before his death, have disposed of all his real and personal estate, and left the respondent destitute of all provision, with no other recourse than to a personal covenant.

But supposing the respondent barred of her dower in consideration of the annuity, yet she could not in any event be barred of any right which the law had given her to a third of her husband's personal estate; that being a matter absolutely foreign to, and could not possibly fall under the consideration or construction of the statute 27 Hen. VIII. or the equity of it, which relates only to real estates. And it was apprehended, that there was no foundation for equity to confirm the agreement of an infant, to waive her distributary share of her intended husband's personal estate, such agreement being altogether unnecessary; as the husband, notwithstanding the marriage, has an absolute power over his personal estate during his life, and may, if he thinks proper, dispose of the whole of it from his wife by will, though no agreement is entered into by the wife, to waive her contingent interest therein, under the statute for settling intestate's estates and it was conceived, that no instance could be shewn, that any agreement made by an infant, could bar him or her of any contingent possible right or interest, either in a real or personal estate.

It has been however objected by the appellants, that a contract for marriage, and for making a provision for the husband [502] or wife, and issue of the marriage, is one entire contract, and that the marriage being had, which is the principal and essential part of the contract, the agreement made thereon previous to marriage, ought to be performed and carried into execution by both or either of the contracting parties, though both or either of them was, at the time of the agreement and marriage, under age.—But it was conceived, that there was no foundation for any such rule either in law or equity; for though the marriage takes place and cannot be rescinded by non-performance of the agreement, yet settlements, or agreements for settling by an infant husband, any of his lands or personal estate, by way of provision for himself and children, cannot be binding upon him, unless he assents thereto after he comes of age; nor can any settlement, or agreement for a settlement by an infant wife on the husband, as a provision for him and her, and the children of the marriage, bind her during the coverture, nor afterwards, unless she assents thereto; so that in all cases of this kind, if the husband when of age, refuses to abide by his agreement, or if the wife, after she becomes a feme sole, also refuses to abide by her contract, the consequence must be, that the husband will be entitled to the personal estate of his wife, and to be tenant by the curtesy of her real estate; and she will be entitled to dower out of her husband's real estate, and to such part of her personal estate as was not received by her husband, in like manner as if no settlement or agreement for a settlement had been made, by both or either of them, before marriage. And therefore it was hoped, that for these reasons the decree appealed from would be affirmed.

After hearing counsel on this appeal, it was proposed to ask the opinion of the Judges as to a point of law, and they were accordingly directed to deliver their opinions to the House upon the following question, viz. "Whether a woman married under the age of 21 years, having before such marriage a jointure made to her in bar of her dower, is thereby bound, and barred of dower, within the statute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10?" And the Judges differing among themselves, they were ordered to deliver their opinions seriatim, with their reasons. Accordingly, Mr. Baron Gould, the Lord Chief Baron, and the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, delivered their opinions in the negative, but the rest of the Judges, namely, Mr. Justice Wilmot, Mr. Justice. Bathurst, Mr. Baron Adams, and Mr. Baron Smythe, delivered their opinions in the