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privy. Nor could it be pretended, that there had been any acquiescence in this case; there could be none by the appellant, for almost as soon as his title accrued, he had brought his bill to be relieved upon the merits; nor could there be any by the first remainder-man William Lawrence, for he died an infant: so that the case [486] seemed to stand perfectly clear from those objections, and came now properly to be determined by the judgment of the House, upon the pure merits and justice of it. That in case the appellant should be considered as bound by the decree of the Lord Keeper Wright, by which the decree of Lord Somers was reversed, the payment of the testator's debts would be impracticable, and his will and intention in that respect defeated; for such advantage had been taken by that decree, that all the debts by mortgage and specialty, amounting to £2140 were still unpaid; and the 24 years term, which was created for that purpose, was within four years of expiring; so that the greatest part of the debts would remain a charge upon the appellant's estate for life. That it would be against the rules of natural equity and justice, if the respondent should be permitted to enjoy the estates devised to her by her husband's will, and at the same time disappoint his intention, by insisting on her dower, for which the lands devised were far more than an equivalent. And that the decree now appealed from, not being grounded upon any opinion of the present Lord Chancellor, as to the merits of the case in the point in question, but upon a supposed acquiescence, and length of time, which it was hoped was sufficiently answered; it ought not to give any sanction to the Lord Keeper Wright's decree, against the decree of the Lord Chancellor Somers; for which of those two decrees was first, or which last, could not be material in the present case, or of any weight against the appellant, as he was no party to, or concerned in either of them.

On the other side it was said to be no where expressed (N. Lechmere, C. Coxe), nor to be collected from the words of the will, that the lands devised to the respondent were for her jointure, or in bar of her dower; neither could it be so averred at law, or in a Court of Equity, she having no estate for her life, but for her widowhood only. That it was not consistent with the tenderness and respect which the testator had for the respondent, to presume that he intended to bar her of her dower, out of the other lands not devised, and to oblige her to accept of £280 per ann.; £60 per ann. part of which, was not to commence till two years; and £90 per ann. other part of it, not till five years after his death, and both to determine at the end of 24 years; so that if the respondent survived that terra, which was very near expiring, she would be reduced to £130 per ann. during her widowhood only, instead of having a third part of £600 per ann. during her life. And, considering that the respondent had already recovered at law, upon a defence made by the persons who were then entitled to the premises, and that such recovery had been established by the judgment of the Court of Chancery, so long since as November 1702, which was never questioned till February 1712, but on the contrary, approved of even by the appellant himself, as appeared by letters under his own hand; it was hoped, that the respondent's dower would not be taken from her; especially in favour of the [487] appellant, who was only a name-sake, and no relation of the testator; but that the appeal would be dismissed with exemplary costs.

Accordingly, after hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the same should be dismissed, and the decree therein complained of, affirmed; and there appearing no direction in the said decree, that so much of the plaintiff's bill, as related to the questioning the dower of the said Dulcibella Lawrence should stand dismissed; it was ordered, that so much of the plaintiff's said bill, as related to that matter, should stand dismissed and it was further ordered, that the appellant should pay the respondent £30 for her costs in respect of the said appeal. (Jour. vol. 20. p. 458.)