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the five years of the said term of 24 years, in case the profits of the trust estate should not be sufficient to discharge the mortgages affecting the same, until after the Master should have made his report.

The defendant Dulcibella being dissatisfied with this decree, applied to the Lord Keeper Wright, for a re-bearing; and accordingly the cause was re-heard on the 4th of July 1701, when his Lordship ordered a case to be stated, 1. Whether the said defendant was barred of her dower by the devise in the will, or not? 2. And if she was not barred of her dower by such devise, whether the plaintiff William Lawrence ought to be relieved in that court? A case was accordingly stated; and on the 18th of November 1702, the cause came on for the Lord Keeper's judgment, upon the case so stated; when his Lordship declared, that he had fully considered of the matter, but conceived there was nothing in the testator's will that did intend that the defendant should be barred of her dower; and in case any such thing did appear by the will, the same would only be a bar at law, and not in that court; and, as the matter had been already determined at law, his Lordship was pleased to reverse so much of the former decree as awarded a perpetual injunction against the said defendant's proceedings at law upon her judgment in dower; and ordered, that so much of the bill as sought relief touching the matter of dower, should stand dismissed.

In consequence of this latter decree, the respondent continued in the quiet possession of the lands assigned for her dower, which, with the lands devised to her, amounted to near £400 per ann. although the yearly rent of the testator's whole estate did not exceed £550; but, by reason of the infancy of the said William Lawrence, the plaintiff in that suit, and the great poverty of his relations, no relief could be sought for against the Lord Keeper's decree.

On the 15th of April 1712, the said William Lawrence died an infant, and without issue and Anthony Lawrence, the next remainder-man, being also dead without issue, the said lands and [485] premises came to the appellant as being next in remainder, under the limitations in the testator's will; subject to the said term of 24 years for the payment of the testator's debts.

The appellant, after his title had thus accrued, found that the personal estate of the testator had been wasted, the rents and profits of his real estate misapplied, and that none of his specialty debts had been satisfied, although the 24 years term created for that purpose was almost expired.

He therefore, in Hilary term 1712, brought his bill in Chancery against the respondent and the trustees, to be relieved against the judgment obtained in dower, and for an account of the personal estate, and of the rents and profits of the real estate, und a proper application thereof according to the testator's will.

On the 5th of December 1715, this cause was heard before the Lord Chancellor Cowper, who was pleased to declare as to the point of dower, that it being a point of right, and so doubtful in its nature, as that the Court had been of different opinions therein, and the last determination which was so long ago as the 18th of November 1702, having remained ever since unquestioned, his Lordship did not think fit to make any variation from what was then determined as to that point; but as to the account taken in pursuance of the first decree, his Lordship declared, that the present plaintiff being no party thereto, ought not to be concluded thereby; and therefore decreed the acting trustee to account for the rents and profits of the trust-estate; and that the same, except the household goods and specific legacies, ought to be applied in a course of administration, and in discharge of the trust-estate.

From this decree, so far as it concerned the point of dower, the plaintiff appealed; alledging (J. Jekyll, S. Cowper), that it was not founded upon the merits and circumstances of the case as to the point in question, which were not debated at the hearing, nor did the Lord Chancellor deliver his opinion thereon; but upon this ground only, that the Court had been of different opinions, and that the last determination was so long ago as the 18th of November 1702, and therefore his Lordship did not think fit to enter into the merits of the case, or vary from that last determination. But to this it might be answered, that it was plain the appellant, who claimed by way of remainder, was not bound by either of the former decrees, being no party, nor claiming under any person who was a party thereto; and therefore the length of time did not seem material in this case, as no laches could be imputable to the appellant for not seeking relief against a decree by which he was not bound, and to which he was neither party or