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out of the trust-estate, or the remainders expectant on estates for life, but was dowable only according to law, out of such lands whereof the testator had the legal estate and inheritance; and that having as a trustee enjoyed the lands of Frenchbrooke, she was accountable for the rents and profits thereof.

The defendant, by her answer to this bill, insisted that she was as well entitled to dower of a trust, as of the lands in which her husband had the legal estate and that by the articles made on the plaintiff's marriage, the lands of Frenchbrooke were reserved to her instead of dower; she admitted that there were articles preceding her marriage with the testator, but where those articles were, or what provision was thereby made for her, she did not know; she also admitted, that she had only £150 for her portion; but insisted, that being no party to the last-mentioned articles, she could not he thereby precluded of her thirds.

The defendant soon afterwards exhibited her cross bill against the appellants, in order to establish their marriage-articles, and the provision thereby made for her; and to set aside the indorsement on those articles, by which she was to have her dower according to law, under pretence that the same was an imposition on her.

[480] The appellants, by their answer to this bill, insisted on their minority at the time of perfecting these articles; that they were neither parties or privy thereto, and that the persons who were parties, had no power to charge the appellant Ellin's estate in any other manner, than as the testator had by his will directed; they also insisted upon the articles made previous to the testator's marriage with the respondent; that the provision thereby made for her, was an effectual bar to her claim of dower; and that she could not, by a breach of trust, make a better provision for herself, than she was legally entitled to.

Both these causes were heard on the 28th of January 1713; when it was decreed, that as the said Mary Lynch was on her part bound by the articles of 1701, she should not be accountable for any profits by her received before that year; and therefore, it was referred to a Master, to state what were the yearly profits of the lands whereof the said George French died seised, who had received the same, and how they were applied; also, what incumbrances were on the said lands, and which of them affected the estate before the title of dower, and which after; and that in the mean time, the said Mary Lynch should be quieted in the possession of Frenchbrooke.

From this decree the present appeal was brought; and on behalf of the appellants it was insisted (S. Cowper, R. Raymond), that the decree was erroneous, and ought to be reversed; because the respondent was thereby decreed to be bound by the appellant's marriage-articles, whereas it never came in question in the cause, whether she was or was not bound by them, but only whether the appellants themselves were thereby bound: as to which question, there could be no sufficient reason to decree in the affirmative, in regard the appellants were neither parties or privy to those articles, but were in fact minors of only sixteen years old, at that time; it was therefore neither equitable or just, that the respondent, by a direct violation of her trust, should bind the appellants by articles, which tended to make a better provision for her than she was entitled to by law. That as to the respondent's not being accountable for any profits by her received prior to the year 1701, there was no foundation for such a decree, either by the will or the articles, or any other fact or circumstance in the cause: but on the contrary, the decree ought to have directed the respondent to account for those profits from the testator's death, and to have ascertained in what manner she should so account, and what allowance should be made her for her dower; and that she should account for all she had received, over and above her dower of those lands, in which her husband during the coverture had the legal estate and inheritance, and whereof she was dowable by law.

On the other side it was argued (J. Jekyll, T. Powys), that the testator having devised a moiety of his estate in general to the respondent for [481] life, after payment of his debts and legacies; it was clearly his intention (though not so expressed) that in the mean time, while the debts and legacies were paying, she should enjoy at least her own third of the rents of his estate; especially as he had made no other provision for her, during the time by him limited for the application of his rents to the payment of his debts and legacies. That she was not only entitled to dower out of the legal estate, but to an equitable equivalent for her dower out of the trust-land; and she was expressly entitled by the will, to a moiety of the rents of the whole estate, from the