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liable to pay the debt, is indeed often mentioned as the ground of decisions which have directed the application of personal estate in exoneration of real estate; but there are many cases in which Courts of Equity have refused to direct personal estate to be so applied, though the testator had entered into covenants, or other personal engagements, to pay the debt for which the real estate had been pledged by his ancestors, or those through whom he claimed, Each of these principles however would exempt the personal estate of Hylton Lawson from being applied to discharge this debt upon the Cramlington estate, which was proved to have been contracted by Robert Lawson the elder, unless the will of Hylton Lawson required it to be so applied, or any circumstances to be found in this case, proved that he intended that it should be so applied. That there was no express mention made of this debt in Hylton Lawson's will, and there was no clause in the will which afforded any proof that he considered it as his debt. The testator created a fund for the payment of his debts, legacies, and funeral expences; but to apply that fund, or any part of it, in discharge of the mortgage debt, would be to dispose of it for the payment of a debt which certainly was not his debt in contemplation of law, though there was no reason to think that the testator meant to use the words, "his debts," in a sense different from that which the law annexes to them. The same observation applies to that clause of the will by which the testator directs, "That all his debts, legacies, and funeral expences, shall be paid by mortgage. or sale of such and so much of his freehold and copyhold lands at Cramlington, Cherton, and Preston, as shall be necessary and sufficient to pay and discharge the same, with all his personal estate;" and furnished an answer to the inference which the appellant wished to draw from it. For if that clause of the will should even be thought to prove that the testator intended that no part of his real estate should be applied in payment of his debts, legacies, and funeral expences, till the whole of his personal estate had been first applied for that purpose, it certainly afforded no proof that he meant to consider this debt as his debt, or to direct any part of his personal estate to be applied in payment of a debt which was not his.

That neither the trusts created by the testator's will, or the limitations thereby made of his real estates, proved that he meant to consider this mortgage as his own debt, or that it should be discharged out of his personal estate. The trusts of the will might be fully executed without paying the mortgage debt: if it had been necessary to sell the Cramlington estate for the payment of the testator's debts, it would have been immaterial to the persons claiming interests in the testator's property, whether this debt was suffered to remain an incumbrance upon the estate, or discharged out of the purchase money at the time of the sale. To insist that [434] the limitations of the estates were such as required that they should be free from incumbrances, was to claim for the devisees in the will a greater interest in the testator's estates, than it appeared he meant to give them. That the fact stated in the appellant's answer, that the personal estate of Hylton Lawson was very inconsiderable at the time when he made his will, proved that he could not then intend to make it a fund for the payment of so considerable a debt; and if his will proved that he had not that intention when he executed it, it could not prove that he had that intention when, by his death, it took effect. That the testator could not be supposed to have intended to charge the mortgage debt upon all his real estates, as well as the Cramlington estate; but the will must be admitted to prove that intention, if it was understood to prove that the testator considered this as his debt. For if his personal estate was by the will made liable to the payment of this debt contracted by Robert Lawson, the real estates at Cherton and Preston were made subject with the Cramlington estate to make good such part thereof as the personal estate would not extend to satisfy. The will therefore afforded no reason to suppose that the testator intended to make any provision for the payment of this debt. It was fair to presume, that when the testator speaks of his debts, he means such as the law would deem his; and the will does afford proof that he used that expression in that sense.

As to the legacy bequeathed to Winefred Collingwood, it was expressly directed by the testator to be paid out of his freehold and copyhold estates. It would not have been payable, if the will had not been duly executed to charge real estate. Personal estate is not in all cases the primary fund for payment of legacies, the testator may exempt it by express words; and though he does not use express words for that purpose, if his intention to exempt it can be otherwise proved, that intention is always to be effectuated by those who are to construe his will. It was impossible to construe the