Page:The English Reports v1 1900.pdf/1420

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III BROWN.
ATKYNS v. ATKYNS [1780]

when in the latter part of his will he was describing the real estate, in the former part devised to be sold for the purpose of giving the residue of his personal estate on the same trusts, he described such real estate by the words "his manor, lands, and hereditaments, in the county of Gloucester," using manor in the singular number, which plainly shewed that he intended only one manor to pass, though the Swell estate consists of a manor as well as the Pinbury estate, and there could not be any ground to contend that any part of the Swell estate was intended to pass if the [415] manor there was not. That it is a settled and invariable rule in construing wills, that an heir at law is not to be disinherited, but by express words, or necessary implication, and that the heir is always to be most favoured in such cases; and it appeared from the will, that the testator had a favourable inclination towards the appellant, his heir, because he thereby gave to the appellant a share of the produce of the estate, which did pass by the will, if by death the testator's children should be reduced to a particular number. And this was an old family estate; and the nature of the case seemed to exclude any doubt, whether it was the intention of the testator that such reversionary interest, as the testator had therein at the time of making his will, and at his death, should be immediately after his death sold, to make a very trifling, if any, increase to the fortunes of his younger children, or should be left to descend to his heir; so that if it should ever come into possession, it should be a solid benefit to him.

On the other side it was said (J. Mansfield, E. Bearcroft, J. Lloyd), that there could not be the least doubt, that the testator Edward Atkyns had a power of devising the reversion in the Swell estate. The only questions therefore must be, whether he meant to do so, and whether he had done so by this will? That the testator meant to devise this reversion, appeared from the situation and circumstances of himself and his family. The estate in Norfolk must of necessity come to the appellant, if he survived his father, who having three younger children, it was natural that he should intend to make for them the beat provision in his power; and it appeared, from the state of his affairs, that such provision would be very small, if the Swell estate did not pass by his will. That the testator had devised the reversion in question appeared by the words themselves, which were plain and intelligible, and sufficient to pass the testator's interest in the Swell estate. The case of Chester and Chester, 3 P. Williams 56, which underwent a very solemn consideration, applied strongly to this point, and was indeed throughout a very cogent authority in favour of the respondents. That it did not appear from the will, negatively, that the testator meant his interest in the Swell estate should not pass; and unless that could be clearly made out on the part of the appellant, the respondents insisted that the words in the testator's will ought not to be restrained by conjecture, but ought to have their natural and legal effect, and pass the testator's interest in the Swell estate, which in point of situation was perfectly within the description of the will.

After hearing counsel on this appeal, the following question was put to the Judges,

Whether the reversion in fee of and in the manor of Lower Swell and other the premises there, and in Upper Swell and Stow-upon-the-Wold, did pass by the will of the testator Edward Atkyns the plaintiff's late father, to, and thereby became vested in Dorothy Atkyns, John Wright junior, and the defendant John Liotard, in trust for the said testator's younger children?

And the Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer having de-[416]-livered the unanimous opinion of the Judges present upon the said question in the affirmative, it was ordered and adjduged, that the appeal should be dismissed, and the decree therein complained of affirmed.

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