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estate; the term effects, in the common understanding of mankind, signifying property or substance of every sort. But in this case, the testator had obviated every quibble about the meaning of the word effects, for he had anxiously joined to it both epithets, real and personal; and through the whole sentence had been particularly studious of the most comprehensive language. To confine this clause therefore to personal estate, or to suppose real effects to be only descriptive of chattels real, would be offering violence to the obvious sense of the words and intention of the testator; who must be presumed to be unacquainted with the technical distinctions of property, and who, without more skill than falls to the share of persons in general, could not be apprised of the exact sense of the term chattel real. 2dly, There is no foundation in law or reason, for confining the words real effects to that species of property called chattels real; for chattels real are clearly personal estate, and would pass under the devise of effects without annexing to it the epithet real, or any other epithet. 3dly, It was evident, that by the devise of all my effects real, the testator intended to devise some property or effects which were not personal; but as reversionary terms for years are personal effects, he could not mean to devise them by this description; consequently, he must have intended to devise his real substance or estate. The second part of this objection would be answered, by observing, that the construction of the will here proposed, anticipated the argument derived from the supposed repugnancy; for the testator's first devise to his mother, was only a part of his real estate; creditors were entitled to another part, i.e. so much as should be sufficient by sale to discharge their encumbrances; the legatees, whose legacies were charged upon the real estate, were entitled to a further part thereof, i.e. to so much as would satisfy their legacies; yet there still remained some part to dispose of; and this remainder the testator had, with perfect consistency, given to his mother by the residuary clause. The views with which he thus made the two devises, were sufficiently obvious; by the former in all events, and subject to no incumbrance, he made provision for the parent of the family; by the latter, he referred to her disposal the residuum which might be, after all the incumbrances should be discharged, and the further objects of his care fulfilled. He had not therefore given part and whole to his mother, as the plaintiff would contend. But even supposing there was an inconsistency in the two devises, the latter must control the former; such being the established rule of construction. Yet, further, if the construction proposed by the plaintiff was to prevail, a similar inconsistency would ensue, viz. between the clause giving his uncle the annuity, and the idea of his suffering the residue to descend to the same person, as heir at law; for to give, or to suffer to take, is in common sense the same thing.

[408] As to the second objection, the rule was admitted; but it was contended, that in this case the heir at law was disinherited both by express words, and necessary implication; for in the residuary clause the testator had made use of the most expressive and comprehensive words, in giving to his mother the whole remainder of his real property, which, but for those words, would have descended to his heir at law; and by necessary implication the real estate must pass to the mother, because the personal estate being totally absorbed by the personal legacies, not charged on the real estate, and his chattels real being barely sufficient to answer the annuity of £30 to his uncle, there remained no other fund for the residuary clause to operate upon, than the real estate. It could not be conceived, that the testator, in so solemn an act as his last will, should invoke the Deity to witness his hypocrisy and dissimulation to a parent, whom he mentioned with so much reverence and affection, and delusively giving her in idea, what he knew at the time she would never in fact enjoy.

After hearing counsel on this writ of error, the Judges were directed to deliver their opinions upon the following question; viz. "Whether the defendant in error, being the lessee of the devisees of Mary Jackson, be entitled to recover the estates in question, or any and which of them?" And the Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer having delivered the unanimous opinion of the Judges in the affirmative, it was thereupon ordered and adjudged, that the judgment given in the Court of King's Bench in England, reversing the judgment of the Court of King's Bench in Ireland, should be affirmed; and that the record should be remitted, to the end such proceeding might be had thereon, as if no such writ of error had been brought into the House. (M. S. Jour. sub anno 1776–7. p. 135.)