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consequence, denied the certainty of the testator's intention to disinherit him. It therefore follows, that the rules of law must here take place; and as it could not be contended, that, after such a contrariety of judgments, the residuary clause did either expressly, or by necessary implication, extend to the testator's estates of freehold or inheritance; it was submitted, that the hereditary title of the heir at law must prevail, while there is a rule of law, which says, he is not to be disinherited otherwise than by express words, or necessary implication. The title of an heir at law is founded on the laws of descent, which are certain, and is not therefore to be superseded by an uncertain devise.

On the part of the defendant it was said (J. Wallace, J. Mansfield, J. Alleyne), that the general question on which the merits of this case turned, was, whether under the residuary clause in the will of George Jackson, his real estates passed to his mother Mary Jackson, in so full and ample a manner, as to enable her to devise the same to the lessors of the defendant? And this question would be determined by the intention of the testator, which always governs, unless it be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the rules of law. The first object of the testator's bounty, and the greatness of his affection, was his mother; for her he determined to secure a certain provision in all events, and therefore gave her a life estate in two denominations of his real property; viz. in Glanbegg and Ballygally, which he would have her enjoy free from any incumbrance. He then proceeded to dispense his bounty amongst his other relations, whom he set down in his will in the same order as they were ranked in nature and his affection. For his brother's children he made provision suited to their ages, and the circumstances of their birth; and these he charged on all the real estates in question. The two next objects of his bounty, were his [406] cousin Henry Wallis, and his uncle Edward Jackson bis presumptive heir; his regard for whom was marked by the legacies he left them. To the former he gave £1000; to the latter advanced in years, only an annuity of £80 for his life; and these, with the subsequent legacies to three other relations, were to come out of his personal estate. Here he paused, and taking a review of the state of his fortune, and the disposition which he had made of it, he perceived that his real estates were more than sufficient to discharge the incumbrances created by his brother, with the additional charges imposed by his own will; and that by deaths, or other events, there might happen to be a residue of his estate; he therefore recurred back to the first great object of his bounty and affection, and, in words the most comprehensive that common sense could dictate, he devised to his mother, by one general sweeping clause, every species of property which he should die possessed of; giving her the enjoyment of, and absolute dominion over it, and confiding in her disposal of it amongst those whom she knew held the first places in his heart:—a trust which she religiously performed. This appeared to be the intention of the testator, and the words which he had used sufficiently effectuated that intention. That he did not mean to die intestate as to any part of his real property, was manifest, not only from the expressive words in the residuary clause, viz. "all the remainder and residue of all my effects real and personal;" but also from the introductory words of the will, "as to my worldly substance;" which have always been understood to consist of real and personal estate, and to indicate an intent in the testator who uses them, to dispose of all his property.

But to this reasoning it was objected, I. That the residuary clause could be construed to extend no farther than to the personal estate; because the terms in which that clause was conceived, carried with them an obvious relation to personality; and because the extending them farther would create an inconsistency between the testator's first devise to his mother for life, and the ultimate disposal of the whole of his real property to her for ever. II. That every degree of favour is to be shewn to an heir at law; and he is not to be disinherited, but by express words, or necessary implication.

To the first objection it was answered, that to support the first part of it the plaintiff assumed three propositions—1st, That the term effects, means personal goods or substance only. 2dly, That the words effects real, are confined to that particular species of property called chattels real. 3dly, That by the devise of effects real, the testator intended to devise to his mother nothing more than the reversionary terms for years, which were to take place in the three descendible freeholds, after the deaths of the several cestui qui vies. But the defendant contended, 1st, That had the testator made use of no other words than "all the remainder and residue of all my effects," without annexing the epithets "real and personal," these alone, upon the true construction of the [407] will, would have been sufficient to have passed the remainder of his real