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acquired after the publication of the will could pass by it, and the word possessed, properly relates only to personal estate. And as to the word real annexed to the word effects, it applied expressly to the chattels real, found by the verdict to have been left by the testator. Nor was there any necessary implication, that any greater interest in the real estates was intended for the mother, than the estate for life, without power of waste, expressly devised to her in two of the denominations. Such an implication, so far from being necessary, was incompatible with, and would merge and destroy, and in fact revoke the mother's express estate for life, and restriction from waste; and would break through another rule as well of law as of common sense, which says, what is expressed shall not be destroyed by implication. To say, that in order to give effect to the intention of a will, we are under the necessity of implying a revocation of it, carries the air at least of a paradox.

But it is said, that we are to presume the testator was inops concilii, and therefore not tied down to use words in their proper sense; and that in some of the Irish bankrupt and insolvent acts, the word effects is applied to real estates.

To this it may be answered, that the testator was a clergyman and a man of letters, which entitles him to credit for a knowledge of the proper sense of words; and indeed the skill he had shewn in the express provisions for his mother, and for his brother's natural children, his conduct in distinguishing the several funds out of which the legacies should arise, and of restraining his mother from waste in the lands devised to her for life, because in part of those lands, viz. Ballygally, the power of committing waste contained in the original lease for lives, might be supposed to pass to her by devise for life, if not expressly restrained, were strong proofs, that he very well understood what he was about: besides, there was some difficulty in reconciling the presumption of the testator's being inops consilii, and a stranger to the meaning of the words he used, with a supposition of his having searched the Irish bankrupt and insolvent acts for the meaning of the word effects, which we must presume he did, when we appeal to those acts for the sense in which the testator used that word. But this appeal to the Irish statutes, forced, extraordinary, and inconsistent as it appeared, was founded on a mistake; for in all those acts, the word effects particularly relates to chattels. In the insolvent act, 23 Geo. II. c. 17. the word effects is always preceded by the word estate, except in one instance only, where the prisoner, whose effects are assigned, is sufficiently described by the assignment of his goods or personal [395] estate. And 1 Geo. III. c. 16. proves clearly, that the words real effects, in the language of the Irish statutes, means leases for years, i.e. chattels real; where it says, that nothing therein shall prevent mortgages, judgments, etc. to take place upon the lands, tenements, or real effects of the prisoner; for the preceding words, lands and tenements, fully comprise all the real estate, and that only, and leave nothing but interests for years in lands, i.e. chattels real, for the words real effects to apply to; and in the same statute, the words estate and effects are together occasionally substituted for the words real and personal estate used immediately before, which preserves their distinction, by referring estate to real, and effects to personal property; and wherever the latter word occurs alone, it has an obvious relation to bank or copartnership stock, or to cash or monies deposited or concealed in the hands of other people; but above all, the form of the oath required by these statutes to be taken by the debtor, marks the distinction by the most manifest application of the word effects, to personal estate only; for the words of that oath in all the Irish insolvent acts are, estate, goods, and effects; so that if the Irish statute book was to be considered as the testator's glossary, there would be an end to the present question; and no doubt would remain, that the words effects real, were used as synonymous with chattels real.

But it had been alledged, that the testator's future interests for 20, 20, and 21 years respectively, in the lands called the Old Mill, Mulcahys, and Darts, and Geohagan, and Burgess land, one of which terms was to commence in possession upon his death, did not fall under the description of chattels real.

To this it was answered, that these interests were created by the covenant and agreement of the lessor with the lessee, found by the verdict, that the lessee and his representatives should enjoy the lands for such terms of years respectively, paying such rents; that such agreements are actual leases, and pleadable as such, and so it has been decided in a great variety of cases (vide Bacon's Ab. Vol. III. p. 419, 420). These leasehold interests were clearly no part of the testator's estate of freehold or inheritance,