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JONES v. MORGAN [1774]
III BROWN.


estate for 99 years any ways enlarged by that will; and that as it did appear by the express words of the devise, that the testator did not mean that Frances's interest should commence in point of time, till after the failure of issue of the body of Lord James, etc. it was a void devise of the reversion to her, because it was future and too remote.

There, by the settlement, the estate of James was a chattel interest only for 99 years; an express limitation in the will to his issue, or the heirs of his body, would not have enlarged that estate for years to an estate tail; and if it could not have been done by express words, certainly it could not by implication: the judges therefore went on the clearest grounds, when they delivered it as law to the Lords, that Lord James's estate for 99 years, was not enlarged by the words of the will. For the words of the will could not operate to give by implication a different estate, from that carved out by the settlement; and no intention appeared to give estates to the heirs general of James, as purchasers; and therefore, as they could not take, it was of consequence that Frances, if she took at all, must take by way of executory devise; and as an executory devise the estate was too remote. But the limitations in favour of Thomas Morgan and his sons, and their issue male, might take effect, by considering the will as having two contingencies in prospect; if the testator should have children by an after-taken wife, the estate should go to those children; but if he should not have such children, then the limitations to his brother and sons should take effect; and the first of these contigencies not having happened, nothing stood in the way of the second.

As to the other point made by Mr. and Mrs. Jones, touching the copyhold and customary estates in the county of Brecon, it was said, that the presumption is, that a man when making his will, does not mean to die intestate as to any part of his property: but in this case, the respondent stood in need of no presumption, as the words were comprehensive enough to include this property: and the appellants could only found their hopes of success, in the words being narrowed from their general import, by the construction attempted to be put upon them. The words are, "All my manors, royalties, messuages, farms, lands, tenements, and hereditaments whatsoever, situate and being within the county of Brecon." These words certainly comprehended this disputed property; but if they were less clear, the more reasonable presumption would be, that this property was included; because it lay in the manor of Brecon, of which the testator was lord, and which undoubt-[357]-edly passed by this devise, and was intermixed with the antient possessions of the family.

In support of the cross appeal, which related to the lands mentioned in the Master's report under the head No. 3, it was said, that the testator was equitably seised of these estates, and therefore there was no occasion to surrender them to the use of his will; and if it appeared from the will, to have been his intention that they should pass, no matter of form stood in the way, to prevent that intention from taking place. That these lands lay intermixed with the settled estate, and part of the park at Tredegar, the mansion of this ancient family, made part of them; it was not therefore probable, that the testator intended to disunite these parcels from the settled estate, and it was presumed, that the words in the residuary clause, all and singular my messuages, manors, royalties, advowsons, parks, lands, tenements, and hereditaments whatsoever and wheresoever, in the said counties, etc. were extensive enough to include these parcels of property. But it was said, that these words were qualified by the parenthesis (not herein before devised), and that these lands were before devised by the clause in the will which directed, that the youngest son Edward Morgan should surrender them to his eldest brother, his heirs and assigns. In answer to this observation, it was sufficient to say, that these words referred to the estates actually before devised, and would admit of no other reasonable construction. The directions to bis son Edward, to surrender to the use of his son William, gave no estate, and were not properly a devise, for Edward was only to surrender such estates as he should have competent interest in, to enable him to surrender, and which he did not take by the will; but these equitable copyholds he could not surrender. In fact it appears by the proceedings in the cause, that there were some copyholds of gavelkind tenure in the manor of Bassaleg, in which the testator had a legal interest, upon which the direction to Edward might operate, and no other could be presumed. The words were, that I shall die seised of. To such as he then had, or should acquire the legal interest in, and should die seised of, the direction given to Edward to surrender was proper; but was totally inapplicable to the lands in question, wherein the testator had only an equitable interest.

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