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LIGHTBURNE v. GILL [1764]
III BROWN.

from intermeddling with any part of the personal estate of which she died possessed, and that all the said personal assets might be deemed the personal estate and effects of the said William Lightburne, deceased; and that the plaintiffs might be decreed to such part thereof, as they were entitled to by the will of the said William Lightburne.

Before the respondents answered, Stafford Lightburne the younger died, and his father Stafford Lightburne clerk, having obtained letters of administration, a bill of revivor was filed against the respondents, to which they appeared, and the cause was duly revived.

The respondents answered the cross bill and bill of revivor, and admitted the settlement, marriage, and will of Mr. Lightburne, his commands to his daughter to hold no friendship or correspondence with them, the proposal of a reference, and their refusal to comply therewith, and that Mr Lightburne never intended that any part of his fortune should go to, or be enjoyed by the respondents, or their sisters or brothers; but they insisted, that as Mary Lightburne did not dispose of her fortune by will, they, as her next of kin, were entitled to the personal estate which she left; and that all changes made by her in her father's personal estate, by purchasing therewith, taking new securities for the same, or otherwise, altered the nature of that estate, and transformed the same into personal estate of the said Mary; and that the appellants were not entitled to a satisfaction, out of her assets, for such part of the personal estate of William Lightburne, as she had so altered, or disposed of; but that they were only entitled to so much of the said William Lightburne's estate, as remained specifically the same at the time of her death; and they admitted that they possessed some part thereof.

Issue being joined in each cause, and witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs in the cross cause, both causes came on to be heard before the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, on the 3d and 5th [255] of February 1761; and on the 26th of the same month, his Lordship was pleased to order, adjudge, and decree, that it should be referred to the Master to take an account, in the original cause, of the assets and effects of the said Mary Lightburne, deceased, into whose hands the same came, and how applied or disposed of, upon which account all just allowances were to be given; and it was further ordered, that each party, plaintiffs and defendants, in the original cause, should be at liberty to examine each other on personal interrogatories; as also, that they should produce, upon oath, all deeds, papers, evidences, and books of account, which they, or either of them, should have in their power or custody relating to the said account, if the Master should see fit; and in case any matter should appear difficult to the Master, in stating the said account, that he should report the same specially; and on return of the said report, such further order should be made as should be fit; and his Lordship was pleased to reserve the consideration of such other, or further directions, as should from time to time be thought necessary; and it was ordered, that the cross bill should be dismissed with costs.

The appellants having obtained an order for rehearing, the causes were reheard accordingly, on the 6th and 10th of July 1762, when his Lordship was pleased to order and adjudge, that the former decree should be affirmed, with costs. But upon a further application of the appellants, his Lordship was afterwards pleased to vary the said order of the 10th of July 1762, by leaving out the direction for payment of costs.

From this decree the appellants appealed, insisting (T. Sewell, C. Yorke), that the intention of the testator was manifest; he gave to his daughter and only child, all his estate, with power to dispose of the same as she should think fit, either on her marriage, or at her death by her will. He was convinced that she would make a prudent use of this power, if she should execute it; and pointed out to her the persons who should be the objects of her bounty: but as he knew that if she should die unmarried, and without making a will, the fortune he had left would go, by course of law, to her brothers and sisters of the half blood, whom he never considered as his relations; he carefully guarded against that event, and in case of her dying intestate and unmarried, he expressly devised it over to his next in blood, the children of his only brother. And the respondents themselves admit, that he never intended any part of his estate to be enjoyed by the persons now decreed to be entitled to it. That the bequest and power of disposition given by the testator to his daughter, though in the first instance expressed generally, was corrected and controuled by the subsequent clauses, by which he devised his estate over to his brother's children, if she should die intestate or unmarried; and this being a contingency which was to take effect within the compass of a life, was a good limitation, by way of executory devise, to those children, who by virtue thereof

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