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of the Duke, and to the contingency of his having a son born, and subject also to the estate for life of Mr. Pelham therein, in case the Duke had happened to die in his life-time without having any son born; and that the limitations of such contingent right or interest in the respondent Lord Vane, being to arise on the deaths of the respondent the Duke and Mr. Pelham without issue male, and they being both in esse at the time of making Duke John's will, the same was a good and valid limitation, to arise within such a reasonable compass of time as had been allowed at [212] law and in equity in limitation of leasehold estates; and he further insisted, that such his right and interest was well grounded, and that the right and interest set up and claimed by the appellants bill was without foundation in law or equity, and that therefore they could not make a good title to a purchasor.

The respondent the Earl of Darlington, by his answer, said, that he was the eldest son and heir of Henry, late Earl of Darlington, who was the eldest son and heir of Gilbert late Lord Bernard; and prayed, that such interest in the premises in question, as he was by law entitled to by virtue of Duke John's will, and the said act of parliament, and the agreement therein mentioned, might be preserved to him.

And the respondent the Duke, by his answer, admitted, that he was in possession of Shimpling Park; and said, that there being only twelve years then to come in the lease, he was ready and willing to procure a lease thereof for a further term, according to the agreement in the bill stated, or such other lease as could be obtained, provided he was not, on account thereof, put to any further charge than keeping down, during his life, the interest of the money to be paid for the fine, fees, and expences on obtaining such lease: but submitted to the court whether, if such new lease should be obtained, the fine, fees, and expences on obtaining the same, ought not to be a charge on the absolute interest in the said leasehold estate, and to be borne by the person or persons who were or was, or on his death should be entitled to such absolute interest therein, the respondent only keeping down the interest thereof during his life and in case the court should be of opinion, that such fine, fees, and expences ought not to be charged on the absolute interest in the said leasehold estate, then he submitted whether he ought to be bound to obtain any such new lease, as he had not any right or title to the said estate longer than for his life.

After the coming in of these answers Mr. Gregory died, having made his will, and the respondent Susanna Gregory sole executrix thereof; who proved the same. Where upon the appellants exhibited their bill of revivor against Mrs. Gregory, and the cause was duly revived against her.

On the 13th, 14th, 16th, and 17th of November, and 4th of December 1759, the cause was heard before the Lord Keeper Henley, when his Lordship was pleased to declare, that he was of opinion, that, as in this case the claims of the respondents Lord Vane and the Earl of Darlington were not within his cognizance to determine, he could not decree a specific performance of the agreement in question against the said Susanną Gregory; and therefore dismissed the appellants bill, as against the respondents Lord Vane and the Earl of Darlington, with costs; and as against the respondents Susanna Gregory and the Duke of Newcastle, without costs.

[213] From this order of dismission the present appeal was brought; and on behalf of the appellants it was said (C. Yorke, T. Sewell), that the question of right between the parties was extremely clear, upon the known and fixed rules of law. Terms for years are not allowed to be settled in the same manner as freehold estates, nor are capable of being limited by proper words of inheritance. In the case of freeholds, successive remainders in tail may all be vested at one and the same time; and may take effect in possession successively, as the respective limitations to each tenant in tail and the heirs of his body shall determine, at any remote distance of time, defeasible only by some tenant in tail in possession, who shall think fit to suffer a common recovery. But a vested estate tail in a term for years, to one and the heirs, or heirs male of his body, implies the absolute ownership of it, though improperly expressed; as much as if the tenant in tail was entitled to it by a correct limitation to himself, his executors, administrators, and assigns. All subsequent limitations therefore, after a general failure of the issue of such tenant in tail, are void; unless made to take effect within the compass of a life or lives in being, or unless the successive limitations in tail of such term or leasehold estate are contingent in their creation; and then they are considered as possibilities, which will finally be either valid or void, effectual or ineffectual, as the