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contradiction or absurdity; that construction ought to be preferred, which explains the intention of the testator with the least violence to his words. That though this case arose upon the devise of a trust, yet the Court of Chancery, in sending it to a court of law, judged that it ought to be governed by the same rules of construction as the devise of a legal estate; and it was submitted, that the will of George Robinson afforded no strong, coercive, legal evidences of intent, such as must induce a court of law, from the necessity of his meaning, to over-rule the legal operation of his words, and vest an estate of inheritance in tail male in Lancelot Hicks, the father of the respondent, who was not related to the testator, in prejudice to the appellant's father, who was certainly one principal object of his bounty, and his heir at law.

It would serve to explain the grounds on which the appellant proceeded, if it was considered, I. What estate was devised to Lancelot Hicks the father. II. What estate was devised to his son.

As to the first question, the testator had not left the possibility of a doubt, if his express declaration deserved any weight. He devised all his real estate (except his lands in Endellyon, and his presentations in Cornwall) to Lancelot Hicks the father for life, and no longer, enforcing his devise by negative words, which have hitherto been allowed, in all the cases adjudged, to be sufficient to prevent any implication by way of enlarging the estate, and extending the duration of it; so that the decree of the Court of Chancery, grounded upon the certificate of the Court of King's Bench, controuled not only the legal force of the words, but their meaning in common use, and in effect expunged them out of the will. That as all the authorities concur against [184] enlarging an estate for life into an estate of inheritance, where negative words are added to strengthen the express devise; so likewise they are uniform in not raising an estate tail by implication in the tenant for life, either by way of present estate in possession, or by way of remainder in tail after other limitations, unless the testator has limited express estates of inheritance to some of the sons or issue of the ancestor, tenant for life, nominatim, or by description; and then devised the lands over to another family, in default of issue generally of that ancestor. But this was the first case in which it had been held, that the tenant for life took an estate tail by implication in virtue of the connecting words, "for want of such issue," where the default of issue on which the implication is raised, is not general, but relative, by force of the word such, to a particular antecedent limitation; and where that antecedent limitation is made only to one son of the tenant for life, without any collective description of his heirs male, or heirs of his body, and without any words devising an inheritance to that son. That there were other circumstances in the will from which it was inferred, that the testator intended to give an estate. of inheritance to Lancelot Hicks, the father; but they seemed too slight to have any weight in the construction. The devise of the advowsons to Lancelot Hicks, was just as doubtful as the devise of the testator's lands, the advowsons being given in a subsequent clause, in the same manner and to the same uses as he had given his estate. The direction to live in his house, was a condition frequently required in a tenant for life, and even the direction to take his name has been said in precedents of authority, to be much too weak to support an implied device of an inheritance, and has in fact been imposed upon some tenants for life, who could not pretend to argue, that any greater estate in the lands was intended for them.

And as to the second question, what estate was devised to the son of Lancelot Hicks If the father took only an estate for life, there was no colour to say, that any one could entitle himself as devisee of an estate of inheritance, by words of purchase in the will. The devise was made after the death of Lancelot Hicks, to such son as he shall have; no express words of limitation were annexed to it to give an inheritance; no words on which it could be implied; the only doubt arising on some words which referred clearly to a failure of issue, (whether a general or limited failure was the question,) not of the son, but of the father. Hence it follows, that the son intended by the will, could only take an estate for life. If Lancelot Hicks had had a son living at the testator's death, in September 1728, the devise would have taken effect immediately, as a vested remainder for life. As no son was born at that time, it was a contingent remainder for life, but vested on the birth of the respondent's eldest brother George Hicks, in May 1734. From that moment the devise was satisfied; and George Hicks dying in March 1738, the limitation over in favour [185] of William Robinson, the testator's heir at law, the father of the appellant, took place. That this construction