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sufficient part of the testator's real estate might be sold, to discharge the debts and incumbrances affecting the same, and that the residue of the estate might be conveyed to the respondent.

The appellant's father put in his answer to this bill, and thereby insisted, that, by the testator's will, the said George Hicks, otherwise Robinson, the elder brother of the respondent, was te-[182]-nant for life in remainder of the testator's estates, immediately expectant on the estate devised to Lancelot Hicks, otherwise Robinson his father for life; and that such estate was a vested remainder in him the said George Hicks, otherwise Robinson; and that no other son of the said Lancelot Hicks, otherwise Robinson, could, under the testator's will, take any estate or interest in the lands thereby devised; and that on the death of such son, he the defendant William Robinson, as heir at law of the testator, or by virtue of his said will, became seised in fee of the reversion of the said estate, immediately expectant on the estate devised for life to the said Lancelot Hicks, otherwise Robinson; and that on his death, he, the said defendant William Robinson, became seised in possession thereof, subject to the charges and incumbrances thereon.

On the 9th of November 1751, this cause was heard before the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, when his Lordship was pleased to order, that a case should be made for the opinion of the Judges of the court of King's Bench, upon the will of the said testator George Robinson, and the material facts appearing in the pleadings in the cause; upon the following question, viz. "Whether any and what estate or interest in the premises in question did, by virtue of the said will, vest in the said Edmund Robinson." And it was ordered, that the said case should be stated as of a devise of a legal estate to Lancelot Hicks, and the several persons to take in remainder after him, without regard to any trusts; and all further directions were reserved till after the Judges should have given their opinion.

Some time after pronouncing this decree, William Robinson died, leaving the appellant his eldest son and heir at law, against whom the suit was regularly revived.

A case was accordingly stated for the opinion of the Judges of the court of King's Bench, which was several times argued before them; and on the 1st December 1756, they were pleased to certify,

That they were of opinion, that upon the true construction of the will of the testator George Robinson, Lancelot Hicks, therein named, must, by necessary implication, to effectuate the manifest general intent of the testator, be construed to take an estate in tail male, he and the heirs male of his body taking the name of Robinson, notwithstanding the express estate devised to the said Lancelot Hicks for his life, and no longer.

On the 8th of March 1757, the cause came on to be heard upon this certificate, and for further directions on the equity reserved, before the lords commissioners for the custody of the great seal, when their lordships (as is usual in such cases upon the foundation of the certificate, and without entering into any debate upon the question) declared, that the respondent Edmund Hicks, otherwise Robinson, as son of the said Lancelot Hicks, was entitled to an estate in tail male in the premises in question, with such remainders over as in the will of the said George Robinson deceased, are mentioned; and decreed, that the trustees should [183] convey the said premises to him and the heirs male of his body, with such remainders over as aforesaid, subject to the jointure of the testator's widow, and other the incumbrances on the said premises; and it was referred to the Master to settle such conveyance, in case the parties should differ about the same; and it was ordered, that the receiver already appointed should be continued till further order, and that the respondent should pay to the defendants and trustees, their costs of the suit to be taxed by the Master.

The heir at law apprehending himself aggrieved by this decree, so far as it declared the respondent entitled to an estate in tail, appealed; and on his behalf it was argued (C. Yorke, G. Perrot), that the greatest difficulty occurring in the construction of wills, is to form a true judgment where the presumed general intent of a testator ought to prevail, and where the legal operation of his words should take place. If the intention can be collected clearly from plain decisive evidences, such as have been received and allowed in courts of law and equity, by the current of authorities in similar cases, it must prevail. But if on the one hand, the presumed intention be obscure and ambiguous, not necessarily implied in the words, and wholly inconsistent with the legal operation; and if on the other hand, the legal operation produces a clear uniform sense, without