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effectual. That this being the case of a legacy, the same might have been sued for in the Ecclesiastical Court; and by the rules of the civil law, such a legacy would have vested absolutely in the first legatee, and the bequest over would have been void: and though by the law of England, Courts of Equity exercise a concurrent jurisdiction [111] with the Ecclesiastical Courts, in suits for legacies, yet the rule of determination ought to be the same. That to allow the bequest over of chattels personal to the respondents by virtue of this will, to be good, was going further than had hitherto been admitted in cases of the like kind. The contingency on which this limitation over was to take place, was for want of issue of Alicia Staines; which, if it had been made with respect to a freehold estate, would have comprehended all issue of her body by the appellant, even to grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc. And in cases of limitations of estates, the same words ought to receive the same construction, otherwise great uncertainty and confusion would be introduced: but the failure of issue of any person generally, was too remote a contingency for the devise over of a personal thing to depend upon. Besides, this case must be considered according to the words of the limitation, and not according to any accident which had happened subsequent to it; and therefore it was apprehended, that if Alicia had left children by her husband, and such children had afterwards died without issue, this devise over could not have taken effect. That by the decree, the appellant was directed to account for what had been received by his wife in her life-time; altho' the interest and produce of the testator's whole estate was given to her sole use, separate and apart from the appellant, and her receipt was to be sufficient for all such parts thereof as she should receive; and therefore Thomas Parsons, the trustee named in her will, ought to have been made a party to the suit. It was therefore hoped, that the decree would be reversed, and the respondents bill dismissed with costs.

On the other side it was said (T. Lutwyche, W. Strahan) to be a known and settled point in equity, that a personal estate may be settled or bequeathed to one for life, with remainder over to another, and it was manifestly so bequeathed in this case; for by the words of the will, the testator's personal estate was not vested in Alicia Staines, she being only entitled to the interest and produce of it for her life; and therefore the limitation over to the respondents, on her death, she having no children, was a good limitation. That tho' the words of the will, whereby the testator left his estate, after the death of Alicia, to his executrix, who was Alicia herself, seemed not to have been well considered; yet there were words sufficient to shew the testator's intention, that she should have only the yearly produce and interest during her life, and that afterwards the appellant's children by her, if there should be any, were to have the estate; and if there were no such children, that then the respondents, the children of Sarah Maddock, should have it; and therefore Alicia being entitled only to the interest and produce of this estate for her life, had no power to dispose thereof by will or otherwise, after death. That the last clause in the will, appointing Alicia executrix and residuary legatee, did in no sort revoke or vary the former clauses, nor were they in any way inconsistent with each other; the executrix being only a trustee for the benefit of the legatees, and to take such residue only as was lapsed or undisposed [112] of. That though the clause which devised the estate after the death of Alicia to his executrix, who was herself, seemed inconsistent, yet the limitation over by the subsequent clause, for want of children of Alicia, would be good; she by the first clauses being only entitled to the interest and produce for her life, and after her death the estate was to go according to the plain intention and words of the testator.

After hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the decree and the affirmance thereof, should be affirmed, with a variation as to the appellant's accounting; which variation was to be by leaving out of the decree these words, viz. ["is come to his hands, or to the hands of his late wife Alicia Staines deceased, or to the hands of any other person, for his, their, or either of their use; for the better discovery whereof,"] and instead thereof inserting those words,

[came at any time to his hands, or to the hands of any other person for his use; and also, for what of the testator's estate came to, or was in the hands of his late wife Alicia Staines, or to the hands of any other person for her use, since the 5th of May 1724, or at any time thereafter; and that an account be likewise taken of what of the said testator's personal estate came to the hands of the said Alicia, after the death of the said testator, to the said 5th of May 1724, which was not paid or delivered over by her to her