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III BROWN.
BARKER v. GYLES [1727]

which the testator gave to Cook for that purpose: it was therefore hoped, that the said decree of the 23d of July would be reversed.

On the other side it was contended (P. Yorke, T. Lutwyche) that no one principle in law was better known or more established than that where a personal estate is given to a man and the heirs of his body, with remainders over to other persons, it is an absolute gift to the first devises, and vests the entire property in him, and that the devise over is void. That as this is a known rule in law, so equity always follows the law in this case; and if such a fundamental rule was once to be altered, it would overturn great numbers of decrees and determinations, and no man would know when he was safe in his property. That the present question being only concerning a personal estate, it was likewise an established rule, both in law and equity, that it must be determined upon the probate of the will, under the seal of the proper Ecclesiastical Court; which probate had no such words therein as were now pretended by the appellants, neither had the first probate which was granted under the seal of the Archbishop's court of Canterbury, and wherein the appellant Mary Stratton joined, any such words. That as to the pretended words themselves, which the appellants would imagine were [after the decease of my sister Ann] there was no one could pretend to any certainty, even if the original will was admitted to be read, that those were the words: and the respondent apprehended there was more reason to suppose that the words were [after the decease of my sister Mary]; and that the testator finding that those words were inserted afterwards in the will, ordered them to be struck out in that place, where they now appeared to be erazed. That as it would be of dangerous tendency to admit parol evidence to explain the written words of a will; it had been the constant practice of all courts, both of law and equity, to reject such evidence, and abide by the will itself: and therefore it was hoped that the decree would appear to be just and well founded, and consequently be affirmed with costs.

Accordingly, after hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the same should be dismissed, and the decree therein complained of affirmed. (Jour. vol. 23. p. 69.)



[104] Case 25.—Robert Barker,—Appellant; Nathaniel Gyles, et al.,—Respondents [22d April 1727].

[Mew's Dig. xv. 1363.]

[J. S. devises lauds to be sold for payment of his debts and legacies, and the surplus to be laid out in the purchase of other lands, to be settled on A. and D. and the survivor of them and their heirs, equally to be divided between them, share and share alike. A. died in the lifetime of the testator, and the question was, Whether his moiety should descend to the testator's heir at law, as a lapsed devise, or should go to B. the surviving devisee? Held, that the first part of the devise made A. and B. plainly joint-tenants; and therefore B. by survivorship became entitled to the whole for life; but that the inheritance being devised to them as tenants in common, one moiety having lapsed by A.'s death, in the lifetime of the testator, shall descend to the testator's heir at law, expectant on the death of B., and that the other moiety shall go to the heir of B.]

2 Wms. 280. 9 Mod. 157. Viner, vol. 14. p. 487. ca. 18. 2 Eq. Ab. 536. ca. 4.

Robert Barker, being seised of a real estate and possessed of a considerable personal estate, by his will, dated the 26th of September 1716, gave and devised to the respondents Gyles and Smith, their heirs and executors, all his manor of Everleigh in the county of Wilts, then in mortgage, and all his right, equity of redemption, etc. in and to the same, and also his personal estate whatsoever; in trust, to sell and dispose of the said real and personal estate, and by and out of the monies to be raised by such sale, and out of the rents and profits of the real estate, until such sale, to pay off such debts as should be due upon any mortgage of the said premises, and all other his debts whatsoever, together with the expenses of his funeral and the legacies

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